Tag Archives: General Data Protection Regulation

Data Protection Impact Assessments under the GDPR

Accountability is an important aspect of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  The accountability principle in Article 5(2) of the GDPR obliges data controllers to be able to demonstrate that they are complying with the data protection principles in Article 5(1) of the GDPR.  Some of the technical requirements placed upon data controllers within the GDPR can be traced back, at least in part, to the accountability principle.  One of the requirements of the GDPR which will assist data controllers to demonstrate compliance with the data protection principles is the requirement to complete, in certain circumstances, a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).

For a number of years supervisory authorities around the EU, including the UK Information Commissioner, have encouraged organisations to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) as part of their promotion of good data protection practice. DPIAs are simply PIAs by another name. The requirements for DPIAs are set out in Articles 35 and 36 of the GDPR.

When do I need to perform a DPIA?

Article 35(1) of the GDPR requires data controllers to conduct an assessment of the impact of envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data, where a type of processing, in particular using new technologies; and taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.  The DPIA must be conducted prior to undertaking the processing envisaged.

Article 35(3) sets out specific circumstances where a DPIA should be carried out by a data controller and those are:-

(a) a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person;

(b) processing on a large scale of special categories of data referred to in Article 9(1), or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10; or

(c) a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale.

When deciding whether a DPIA is required it will be important for data controllers to check the ICO’s website. The Information Commissioner is required to publish a list of the kind of processing operations which are subject to the requirement for a DPIA.  If the processing operations envisaged by a controller appear on this list, then they will be required to carry out a DPIA.  Article 35(5) also empowers the Information Commissioner (but does not require her) to establish and publish a list of the kind of processing operations for which no data protection impact assessment is required.

What does a DPIA require?

Article 35(7) sets out what the DPIA must include as a minimum; these are:-

  • a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest pursued by the controller
  • an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to the purposes
  • an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects (the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity, may result from personal data processing which could lead to physical, material or non-material damage – see recital 75 of the GDPR for more detail)
  • the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data; and to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons concerned

It should be noted that requirements set out in Article 35(7) for the content of a DPIA are a minimum; there may be situations when a DPIA requires to go beyond what is set above.

The role of the Data Protection Officer

If you have appointed a Data Protection Officer, then Article 35(2) of the GDPR requires that you seek advice from them when carrying out a DPIA. It should be remembered that a DPIA might change a number of time during the process; you should therefore keep your DPO involved throughout and be seeking advice from them regularly at appropriate junctures. Seeking advice from the DPO is not simply a box ticking exercise and should therefore not be treated as such. If you treat it as a simple box-ticking you could find yourself not complying properly with the requirements of the GDPR and could potentially be missing out on valuable advice. Remember that controllers are not obliged to follow the advice of their DPO, but if they elect to act contrary to that advice then they should document this and could be required to defend that decision.

The Role of The Information Commissioner

I have already indicated that the Information Commissioner has a role in the DPIA process, but her role is more extensive than has already been covered above. There are circumstances, set out in Article 36 of the GDPR, in which controllers will be required to consult with the ICO.  This applies where, in the absence of any mitigating measures by the controller, the DPIA indicates that the processing would result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects.

Within a period of 8 weeks following receipt of the request for consultation (but this may be extended by a further 6 weeks in appropriate cases) the Information Commissioner is required to provide written advice to the controller where she is of the opinion that the intended processing would infringe this Regulation.  It’s therefore important that you consult the Commissioner well in advance of undertakng the envisaged processing to ensure that you have enough time to receive any written advice from the Commissioner and to consider and apply it.

The Information Commissioner’s role does not end there; she is not simply limited to giving written advice to the controller.  She can also become much more involved by conducting a data protection audit; issuing a formal warning that the intended processing is likely to infringe the provisions of the GDPR and even limit or prohibit (temporarily or indefinitely) a data controller from undertaking the proposed processing.

Penalties

A failure by a controller to comply with its obligations to conduct a DPIA where one is required can attract an administrative fine of up to €10,000,000 or 2% of global turnover (whichever is greater); as can a failure to consult with the Information Commissioner where consultation is required under Article 36 of the GDPR.  Failure to comply with an order limiting or prohibiting the processing (whether temporary or indefinite) can attract an administrative fine of up to €20,000,000 or 4% of global turnover (whichever is greater).

Can I undertake a DPIA when one is not required by the GDPR?

Yes you can; a properly completed DPIA will be of assistance to you in demonstrating that you are complying the the data protection principles. A DIPA on its own will usually be insufficient to completely comply with the Artcile 5(2) obligations (even where it is required by Article 35), but a properly completed DPIA is certainly something that you can produce to the Information Commissioner to help evidence that you are taking your data protection obligations seriously.

Alistair Sloan

If you require advice or assistance with Data Protection Impact Assessments or any other data protection matter then contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 229 0880 or by E-mail. Alistair can also assist with other aspects of information law.

The Tension Continues: GDPR, FOI and EIRs

An exemption that is frequently deployed by Scottish public authorities is the exemption in section 38 of Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (along with its corresponding exception in the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004, regulation 11) which relates to personal data; both the personal data of the requester themselves as well as the personal data of third parties.  Data protection law is changing later this month and as a consequence section 38 (as well as Regulation 11 of the Environmental Information Regulations) will also see some amendment.

The Data Protection Bill proposes amendments to both the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (“FOISA”) as well as the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (“the Scottish EIRs”).  The Bill is still making its way through the UK Parliamentary procedure and is due to have its third reading later today (9 May 2018) and, subject to completing its passage through Parliament in time, will come into force on 25 May 2018.  There are currently no amendments tabled in the Commons ahead of the Bill’s third reading that would affect the relevant provisions in the Bill, but it is important to bear in mind that until the Bill completes its journey through the various stages of the legislative process it can be amended – even if it passes the Commons today, it still has to go back to the House of Lords and could become locked in a game of ping-pong between to the Commons and the Lords during which time it could be further amended.  However, it seems unlikely that there will be any changes to the relevant provisions within the Bill.

Schedule 18 to the Bill proposes the amendments that should be made to a wide range of primary and secondary legislation, both reserved and devolved.  Paragraphs 88-90 of Schedule 18 (as it stands at the time of writing) contain the amendments that will be made to section 38 of FOISA; meanwhile paragraphs 292-294 of Schedule 18 contain the amendments that will be made to the Scottish EIRs.

The Office of the Scottish Information Commissioner has published, in draft form, updated guidance on the application of section 38 to take account of the GDPR and the expected amendments to the relevant parts of FOISA and the Scottish EIRs. As it is still in draft form, anybody relying upon it (requester or public authority) should continue to monitor it to ensure that it has not been updated.

The proposed amendments to FOISA and the Scottish EIRs look, on the face of it, quite significant.  However, the addition of a lot of text to section 38 and regulation 11 does not necessarily mean that there will be a drastic change in practice on the ground.  One thing that public authorities should be aware of is the proposed subsection (5A) to section 38 and the proposed paragraph (7) of regulation 11.  These proposals will have the effect of re-instating the ‘legitimate interests’ condition for lawful processing where public authorities are considering the release of third party personal data under the FOISA or the Scottish EIRS.

In short, what this will mean is that public authorities will be able to consider legitimate interests in the same way as they do now under condition 6 of schedule 2 when dealing with FOI requests under either regime.  Had it not been for these proposed provisions then the GDPR might well have had a significant impact upon the release of third party personal data under FOISA and the Scottish EIRs; it would have had the effect of removing the processing condition mostly relied upon when releasing third party personal data in response to FOI requests.  It should be noted that Schedule 18 to the Data Protection Bill proposes re-instating the legitimate interests condition in respect of the release of third party personal data under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (see, as at the time of writing, paragraphs 58 and 289 of Schedule 18 respectively).

There is very little difference between condition 6 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 1998 and the legitimate interests condition in Article 6 of the GDPR and in practical terms there is almost no difference at all.  The only real area where there may be some difference is where the third party personal data is that of a child where Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR instructs data controllers to have particular regard to the interests and fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects who are children.  In reality, the fact that a data subject is a child is likely to always have been a factor that has been taken into consideration when undertaking the balancing exercise required by Condition 6 of Schedule 2 and so even to this extent there is unlikely to be much in the way of change.

Of course, the provisions are untested and the Commissioner and courts could take a different view, but in my view we are likely to see the release of the same sorts of third party personal data under FOISA and the Scottish EIRs after the GDPR as we do now.  Furthermore, there is the question as to whether the re-introduction of legitimate interests for FOI purposes is lawful in terms of EU law.  Article 85 of the GDPR does require Member States to reconcile the right to protection of personal data under the GDPR with the right to freedom of expression and information.  Whether the UK Government’s method of reconciling the two, by effectively disapplying the prohibition on public authorities relying upon legitimate interests in respect of the performance of their tasks, is permitted by EU law is something we might need to wait to discover (then again, the UK might not be in the EU long enough for that matter to be determined – but that’s a whole different issue).

In conclusion both requesters and public authorities should familiarise themselves with the amended section 38 and regulation 11.  In practice not much, if anything, is likely to change when it comes to the releasing of third party personal data under FOI laws (both Scottish and UK regimes). However, public authorities and requesters should keep a close eye on the decisions of both the Scottish and UK Information Commissioners as well as the First-Tier Tribunal, Upper Tribunal, English and Welsh Court of Appeal, the Court of Session and the UK Supreme Court.

Alistair Sloan

If you require any assistance with any Freedom of Information or Data Protection/Privacy law matter you can contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 229 0880 or by E-mail.  We also have a twitter account dedicated to information law matters from across the UK.

New Data Protection Fees

The draft Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018 have now been laid before Parliament by the UK Government; it is intended that they will enter into force on 25th May 2018.  The Regulations will introduce the new charging regime that is to replace “notification fees”, once the requirement upon data controllers to notify the Information Commissioner of their processing of personal data.

As expected, the fees will move from the current two-tier structure to a three-tier structure; however, the fee amounts are different to what was proposed in the consultation last year.  The tiers are as follows:

Tier 1
Data controllers who fall into tier 1 will pay an annual fee of £40 to the Information Commissioner.  You fall into this fist tier if you have a turnover of less than or equal to £632,000 for your financial year, or you have no more than 10 members of staff.  Charities also fall into this category as do small occupational pension providers.

Tier 2
Data controllers who fall into tier 2 will pay an annual fee of £60 to the Information Commissioner.  You will fall into this tier if you do not fall into tier 1 and have a turnover less than or equal to £36m for your financial year, or have no more than 250 members of staff.

Tier 3
Data controllers who fall into tier 3 will pay an annual fee of £2,900 to the Information Commissioner.  All non-exempt data controllers who do not fall into the first two tiers will fall into tier three.  The Commissioner has indicated that they will assume that every data controller falls into tier 3 unless they prove the contrary.

These fees do represent a shift from the levels that were consulted on last year.  In particular the top-tier fee that was suggested in October was £1,000 but has now become £2,900.  Data controllers can save themselves a bit of money (a grand total of £5) by paying their annual fees by Direct Debit.

The fees structure that was consulted on had suggested that there would be a premium to be paid by any data controller that also carried out direct marketing activities by electronic means; however, that hasn’t been given effect to in the draft Regulations that have been laid before Parliament,

In terms of working out how many members of staff you have for the purposes of these regulations you can’t just count the number of employees you have.  A member of staff, for the purposes of the Regulations, is: (i) an employee; (ii) a worker, within the meaning of s.296 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992; (iii) an office holder; or (iv) a partner.  Part-time members of staff are counted as one member for these purposes.  To calculate the members of staff you need to work out how many members of staff you employed each month in your last financial year, add together the monthly totals and then divide it by the number of months in your last financial year.  Even members of staff who work outside of the United Kingdom (and, indeed, the European Union) need to be counted.

You do not need to work out how many members of staff you have if you are a charity or if you are a small occupational pension scheme.  Public authorities are required to ignore those reference to turnover and are required only to determine how many members of staff that they have.

If you are processing personal data solely for one of the following eight purposes, you do not need to pay a fee to the Information Commissioner:

  1. Staff Administration;
  2. Advertising, marketing or public relations,
  3. Accounts and records,
  4. Not-for-profit purposes
  5. Personal, family or household affairs
  6. Maintaining a public register
  7. Judicial functions
  8. Processing personal information without an automated system such as a computer

To be able to rely upon this exemption your processing must be solely for one or more of the above noted purposes.  If your processing is for one of those activities in addition to another activity then you will need to pay the fee at the appropriate tier.

In order to ensure that data controllers are paying the correct level of fee, the draft Regulations have provision within them for data controllers to supply various pieces of information to the Information Commissioner; this information fits around establishing which, if any, of the three tiers the controller falls into.

There are a couple of final things to note.  The first is that if you pay a notification fee prior to 25th May 2018 then you will not be required to pay the new fees until that notification has expired.  Therefore, if you are due to notify the ICO under the Data Protection Act 1998 on or before 24th May 2018 you will not be required to pay the new fees until next year.  The final thing to note is that these Regulations are only in draft form; they are still subject to parliamentary approval and could be amended.  However, this blog post reflects the position as contained within the draft Regulations.  Large organisations should, however, be planning to pay significantly more to the Information Commissioner than the £500 they have been paying until now.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with a privacy or data protection matter, including the GDPR, or any other information law matter then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

It’s just legitimite interests, isn’t it?

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) becomes applicable in the United Kingdom on 25th May 2018.  Preparations are well underway in business, government and the regulator for the new privacy and data protection landscape.  People are trying to find their way through the GDPR and the Data Protection Bill to understand exactly what it is that they’re required to do in order to comply with the new framework, but there are a lot of misunderstandings about certain requirements of the GDPR.  I have already dealt with one of those, the issue as to whether or not consent is required under the GDPR on this blog.  Another area where there appears to a lot of misunderstanding is with the legitimate interests ground for processing, especially in the area of direct marketing.

Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR provides that it is lawful to process the personal data of a data subject where the “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.”  This is the legitimate interests ground for processing; but as can be seen from a proper reading of the condition, it is not the silver bullet condition that some people seem to think that it is.

There are essentially three elements to the condition:  (1) necessity; (2) legitimate interests of the controller or a third party; (3) the interests or fundamental rights of the data subject.  Therefore before being able to rely upon legitimate interests as the processing condition, it is essential that controllers go through a three stage process.  The first stage is to identify what the interests are.  In determining whether the interest identified by the data controller is a legitimate interest, it is necessary for them to consider whether a data subject can reasonably expect, at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data, that processing for this purpose may take place.  If a data subject could not reasonably expect that the processing envisaged by the data controller may take place, at the time and in the context of collection of the personal data, it will not be a legitimate interest.

The second stage is to consider necessity; the processing must be necessary for the legitimate interest(s) being pursued.  If the processing is not necessary then a data controller cannot rely upon the ‘legitimate interests’ condition for processing the personal data in question.  The ICO currently puts it this way “[i]f you can reasonably achieve the same result in another less intrusive way, legitimate interests will not apply.”  It is therefore essential to consider whether there are other ways to fulfil the legitimate interest(s) identified.  The test does not require it to be “strictly necessary” or “absolutely necessary”, but it is still a high test

The final element that needs to be considered before a decision to rely upon legitimate interests can be taken, is whether the legitimate interests are overridden by the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.  This can be a very difficult assessment to make and can, on occasions, be on a knife-edge.  It is fundamentally about proportionality and in a lot of cases the data subject’s fundamental rights and freedoms will override the legitimate interests with the result that another condition needs to be found to enable processing take place.

At the very outset I did mention that there is a lot of misunderstanding about legitimate interests in the field of direct marketing.  It is true that the GDPR does state, in Recital 47, that “[t]he processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes may be regarded as carried out for a legitimate interest”, but it’s not as simple as that.  Firstly it is important to note that the Recital states that it “may be” a legitimate interest; that is not the same thing as saying that it “will be” or “is” a legitimate interest.  It only opens the door to marketing being a legitimate interest; it does not remove the need to consider whether it is, in any given context, a legitimate interest.

Secondly, it is important not to consider the GDPR in isolation.  I have already written about the forgotten relative of the GDPR:  The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.  These are extremely relevant when conducting direct marketing by electronic means (such a by telephone, E-mail or text message).  Processing personal data for the purposes of marketing might well be lawful because it can be shown that it is a legitimate interest for the controller or a third party, but how that marketing is then delivered must comply with the other relevant laws and codes which regulate marketing activity.

The legitimate interests condition is a flexible one, but data controllers should not assume that if no other condition applies, or is appropriate, that they can simply say “it’s legitimate interests” and be done with it.  Where a controller does rely upon legitimate interests, the accountability principle will kick in and the supervisory authority may well ask for it to be justified.  Therefore, where it is proposed to rely upon legitimate interests a record should be kept demonstrating how each of three elements to the legitimate interests condition is met.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with a privacy or data protection matter, or any other information law matter then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

 

Data Protection, Brexit and the Charter of Fundamental Rights

On the face of it the Irish Supreme Court’s decision in Minister for Justice v O’Conner [2018] IESC 3 has no place on a blog focused on information law matters as they apply in Scotland and the wider United Kingdom.  The case involves a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued by the United Kingdom and the surrender of the individual to the United Kingdom under that EAW.  The Irish Supreme Court has granted leave to Mr. O’Connor to appeal to it; this is so that a reference can to be made to the Court of Justice of the European Union.  The context of that reference is the giving of notice by the United Kingdom under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union and that as a consequence the United Kingdom will leave the European Union.

It is not obvious what this has to do with information law at all; however, it might well have an impact upon the flow of personal data between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

The UK Government has identified a number of ‘red lines’ in its negotiations with the European Union; one of those red lines is that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union will cease to apply to the United Kingdom when it leaves the European Union.  All of the public statements which have been made by Ministers is suggestive that the Charter will not be incorporated into UK domestic law and it will not agree to a treaty with the European Union which continues its application.  Whether or not that is the case at the end of the day remains to be seen; however, it is creating uncertainty.

My initial thoughts on this case are that it could be significant beyond the question of extradition under the EAW scheme.  From a reading of the judgment of the Irish Supreme Court, it is clear that there are fundamental issues of European Union Law to be addressed in this reference.

It is a consequence of the operation of Article 50 that at the end of the two year period provided for therein that the treaties cease to apply to the leaving State (subject to an agreement to extend the Article 50 period or any agreement between the EU and the leaving state which continues the application of EU law).  At its most basic, it means that European Union Law ceases to apply to the leaving state.  This is a very real problem and is the reason for the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which has its aim to ensure that the domestic statute book works and certainty is given as to what the law in the United Kingdom is.

So, what precisely does this have to do with information law?  Articles 44-50 of the General Data Protection Regulation deal with transfers to third countries; a third country being a country which is outside of the Union.  Upon Brexit the United Kingdom will be outside of the Union and the flow of personal data from controllers and processors inside of the Union to controllers and processors in the United Kingdom will need to be in compliance with Articles 44-50 of the GDPR.

What most people in the data protection world are hoping for is that the United Kingdom will get a favourable adequacy decision from the European Commission; which will enable the free flow of personal data between the Union and the United Kingdom on much the same basis as it is presently while the United Kingdom remains part of the European Union.  However, many are sceptical as to whether the United Kingdom will be successful in gaining such a decision; it may not be enough simply to show that the GDPR still forms part of UK domestic law, but that is a topic for another blog post.

What appears to be the underlying issue in the reference being made by the Irish Supreme Court, is whether a person can be surrendered to the United Kingdom under a EAW while there is uncertainty about what the arrangements will be after Brexit in terms of that citizen’s rights under European Union Law.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union features a number of times in the judgment and seems to be one of the areas of EU law that is at issue (and Article 8 of the Charter guarantees rights to the protection of personal data).

It seems to me that if the opinion issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in respect of the reference made is in any way supportive of Mr. O’Connor’s position, it could raise questions not only about personal data transferred between the Union and the UK post-Brexit; but also about personal data which is transferred pre-Brexit and which will continue to be processed in the United Kingdom post-Brexit.

This reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union is certainly one that data protection professionals ought to be keeping an eye on; it has the potential to cause severe headaches for controllers and processors who rely on personal data coming in from the other 27 members of the European Union.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with a privacy or data protection matter, or any other information law concern then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

PECR: The forgotten relative

Much of the focus in relation to data protection and privacy law is on implementation of the Genera Data Protection Regulation, which becomes applicable from 25 May 2018.  However, many of the discussions that are taking place in respect of GDPR implementation are forgetting the GDPR’s older cousin:  the snappily named Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications).  This Directive from the European Union dating from 2002 was implemented in the United Kingdom through the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (“PECR”).

 The Directive on privacy and electronic communications is concerned with the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and is of importance to telecommunications providers, Internet Service Providers and any person or organisation who conducts direct marketing by electronic means; however, this blog post is concerned only with direct marketing and is a follow-up to my recent blog post on whether consent is required under the GDPR.

The GDPR might be the big thing at the moment, but it is important not to consider it in isolation.  When thinking about GDPR implementation it is necessary to take a holistic view and think about how it interacts with other laws because these other laws don’t stop having effect just because of the GDPR.  Therefore, it is essential to consider how these other laws affect your GDPR implementation.

The rules on direct marketing by electronic means are relatively simple and straightforward, but this does not stop unlawful behaviour from taking place on an industrial scale.  Rarely does a month go past without the Information Commissioner’s Office publishing information on enforcement action it has taken against businesses arising out of failing to comply with PECR, especially since the law changed to lower the legal threshold for Monetary Penalty Notices in relation to PECR infringements.

Electronic Mail
Electronic Mail includes E-mail and SMS text messaging.  The general rule for direct marketing by electronic mail is that you need consent, as defined by the 1995 Data Protection Directive.  This means that you must have a freely given, specific and informed indication that the person to whom you are directing the marketing wants to receive such marketing.

There is an exception to this which is referred to as the “soft opt-in”.  This applies where you have obtained a person’s personal data “in the course of the sale or negotiations for the sale of a product or service” to them.  You can then send direct marketing to this person, without first gaining their express consent, where you are marketing your own similar products or services.  The data subject must be “given a simple means of refusing (free of charge except for the costs of the transmission of the refusal) the use of his contact details for the purposes of such direct marketing, at the time that the details were initially collected”.

Each direct marketing communication that is sent must include a simple means of opt-out of further direct marketing content (and this must be free of charge, except for the costs of transmission of the opt-out).

Telephone:  Automated calls
The rules for direct marketing by telephone are split into automated and unsolicited live telesales calls.  In the case of automated calls with recorded information played when the phone line being called is answered, the subscriber (i.e. the person who has contracted with the telephone service provider) must have notified the caller (or the person instigating the call where the caller is a third party acting on behalf of the instigator) that, for the time being, they consent to receiving such calls.  Again, this requires there to be a freely given, specific and informed indication.  Consent can be withdrawn.

Telephone:  Unsolicited live telesales calls
You do not require consent to make such calls; however, you must not make such calls where the subscriber has notified you that they do not wish to receive such calls, or if the number is registered with the Telephone Preference Service (TPS).  You can call numbers registered with the TPS where the subscriber has consented to receiving calls from you, notwithstanding that the number is registered with the TPS.  Consent can, as always, be withdrawn at a later date.

Fax
Yes, it is still a thing and some people (and indeed whole sectors) still use fax machines.  However, as it is more or less an obsolete technology all I will say on the matter is that PECR regulates the use of fax for direct marketing and the relevant parts are Regulations 20 and 25.

That is a very brief run through of the relevant law as it stands today.  However, a couple of points to note in closing:  Firstly, the EU is currently working on a replacement to the current Directive.  It had been anticipated that the new E-Privacy Regulation would be implemented alongside the GDPR, but work started on it too late and so it won’t.  Whether it will be finalised in and in force prior to Brexit is something that we will need to wait and see.  Secondly, depending on what happens with the Brexit negotiations it may still end up being part of UK law even if it comes into force after the UK leaves the EU.  Thirdly, there is likely to be some temporary adjustments to PECR from 25 May 2018, that is because PECR adopts a lot of definitions from the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 1995 Data Protection Directive (both of which will be repealed on 25 May 2018).  Finally, the domestic Regulations were made under the European Communities Act 1972; therefore the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill may well have some impact upon them.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with a privacy or data protection matter, or any other information law concern then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

GDPR: Do I need consent?

The General Data Protection Regulation becomes applicable in the United Kingdom later this year, the 25th May to be precise.  There is a lot of information out there on the GDPR; some of which is incorrect.  Relying upon incorrect information could cause data controllers and processors unnecessary headaches.

In this blog post I am going to focus on just one aspect of the GDPR, upon which there seems to still be a large amount of misinformation floating around.  It is an issue of such fundamental importance that getting it wrong will inevitably lead to headaches and crises in businesses and other organisations that simply do not need to exist:  that aspect is consent.

It is not difficult to find information on the internet selling the idea that the GDPR requires the consent of data subjects before a data controller can process personal data.  It should be obvious, but in case it is not, that is completely false.  Article 6 of the GDPR sets out six grounds which make the processing of personal data lawful under the GDPR; one of those six grounds is indeed consent, but it therefore follows that there are five other grounds of lawful processing which do not require the consent of the data subject.

It is important to understand Article 6 to ensure that your GDPR preparations are on the right track; one of the first things that any data controller who is preparing for the GDPR needs to establish is upon what basis they are processing the personal data.  If a data controller goes off in the wrong direction by assuming that consent is always required then they’re going to hit a problem:  what if a data subject refuses you consent, or withdraws consent which was previously given, to process personal data where you have a statutory obligation or some other compelling business need to process it?  You’re still going to have to process that personal data, but having asked the data subject for their consent you have given them a false impression.  One of the most fundamental aspects of the GDPR is fairness:  giving a data subject a false impression on the need for consent cannot be considered to be fair.  In short, if you need to process personal data irrespective of whether the data subject has given their consent; then consent is not the appropriate Article 6 ground to rely upon.

As noted above, there are a total of six grounds in Article 6 of the GDPR which make the processing lawful.  The grounds in Article 6 are (and note they do not appear in any special order of importance):

  • the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;
  • the processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract
  • the processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject
  • the processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person
  • the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller
  • the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child

Picking the right Article 6 grounds to legitimise your processing is vital; it feeds into so many other aspects of data protection compliance (such as your privacy notice).  Consent should only become a consideration where none of the other grounds of lawful processing in Article 6 apply.  Where some may be becoming confused with regards to consent is the requirement to be transparent with data subjects.  You have to tell data subjects clearly, and in easy to understand language, what personal data you are processing about them, how it is being processed and why you are processing it.  This is not the same as gaining their consent and should not be confused as such.

Alistair Sloan

If you require advice and assistance with any aspect of getting prepared for the GDPR, or any other Privacy and Data Protection law matter then contact us on 0345 450 0123 or you can send Alistair Sloan and E-mail.

Information Law Review of 2017

2018 is now upon us and this is a big year in the field of Information Law, the General Data Protection Regulation will at last become applicable in the United Kingdom.  If you are a data controller or a data processor, your preparations for the GDPR should be well under way; however, if you have not yet started to prepare for these regulations then it is not yet too late.  The lesser known brother of the GDPR also kicks in this year, the Law Enforcement Directive, which governs the processing of personal data by law enforcement agencies.

However, before I get stuck into what is coming this year in the field of Information law, I want to take a moment to look back at some of the things that happened in 2017.  At the tail end of 2017 the High Court in England issued its anticipated judgment in the case of Various Claimants v WM Morrisons Supermarket PLC  [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB)This represented a significant development in the data protection field and opens up a much wider range of circumstances in which data subjects can sue a data controller under Section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998.

In October 2017, the Irish High Court made a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union at the request of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner seeking a preliminary ruling on “Privacy Shield”, the successor to the Safe Harbour rules which had previously been held to be unlawful by the European Court.

In September 2017, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision concerning the application of the right to a private and family life contained in Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights to the monitoring of a person’s communications by their employer.

Also in September 2017, the UK Government published its Data Protection Bill which will replace the Data Protection Act 1998, extends GDPR standards to areas not within the competence of the European Union and implements the Law Enforcement Directive, among other things.

Now looking ahead to 2018, it is possible that we might see a decision from the English Court of Appeal in the Morrisons case referred to above, the judge having granted permission to Morrisons to appeal his findings in relation to vicarious liability.  We may also see claims for compensation being made based upon the Morrisons decision.

In Scotland, we will be expecting to see some more progress made by the Scottish Parliament in its consideration of the Children and Young People (Information Sharing) (Scotland) Bill.  I provided written evidence to the Education and Skills Committee on this Bill last year.  The Committee has had some difficulty in completing its Stage 1 consideration of the Bill and the previous deadline of 22 November 2017 for completion of Stage 1 was removed by the Scottish Parliament.

It is also possible that we will see the Scottish Parliament’s Public Audit and Post-Legislative scrutiny Committee begin to undertake a post-legislative inquiry into the operation of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (or announce that such an inquiry will take place in due course).  If such an inquiry does take place, it will be the first time that there will have been a complete review of the Scottish FOI Act and how it is operating.

Staying on the subject of Freedom of Information in Scotland, we are likely to see the outcome of the Scottish Information Commissioner’s formal intervention in respect of the Scottish Government’s compliance with the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.  We are also likley to see an Order being made under Section 5 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 designating Registered Social Landlords as scottish public authorities with effect from 1st April 2019.

By the end of 2018 we should also hopefully have a much better idea as to what the UK’s relationship with the European Union will be after it leaves, and in particular what impact this will have on data protection and privacy law in Scotland and the rest of the UK.

There will no doubt be a raft of new court decisions in relation to both Privacy/Data Protection and Freedom of Information over the course of the next 12 months and I will attempt to address the most important and unusual decisions here on the Information Law Blog from Inksters Solicitors.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with Privacy and Data Protection matters (including GDPR preparation) or with UK and Scottish Freedom of Information requests contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or you can E-mail him.

Registered Social Landlords and FOI

Yesterday, the Scottish Government began a consultation on legislation to formally designate Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) as Scottish public authorities for the purposes of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (“FOISA”).  The draft Order being consulted on proposes a commencement date of 1st April 2019.

This is not an unexpected development in the field of information law.  In December 2016 the Scottish Government consulted on the principle of designating RSLs as public authorities for the purposes of FOISA.  It has been widely anticipated that RSLs would be designated as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA.

A designation as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA will have ramifications for RSLs beyond the obvious need to comply with FOISA and being under the regulatory oversight of the Scottish Information Commissioner.  It will also have implications for RSLs in respect of how they implement the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which becomes applicable from 25th May 2018.

There are a number of aspects of the GDPR which are directed towards public bodies.  The Data Protection Bill currently before the UK Parliament defines what a public body is for the purposes of the GDPR.  Clause 6 of the Bill provides that a body which is designated as a Scottish public authority for the purposes of the FOISA is a public body.  This will mean that RSLs will have to appoint a Data Protection Officer; even although many of them would not have had to before this decision was taken by the Scottish Government.

It also has implications for the grounds upon which they can legitimately process personal data.  Processing of personal data for the purpose of pursuing a legitimate interest of the controller is permissible under the GDPR.  However, the GDPR goes on to provide that public bodies cannot rely upon legitimate interest as a ground of processing in performance of their tasks.  Therefore, any RSL that has been preparing for the GDPR on the basis that they will be able to process personal data on the legitimate interests ground will have to re-evaluate its processing of personal data ahead of its designation as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA.

It is worthy of note, simply for interest, that the Data Protection Bill proposes giving the Secretary of State the power to make regulations which state that a public body is not in fact a public body for the purposes of the GDPR.  However, there has been no indication that the Secretary of State intends on making use of this power or how the power is intended to be used; therefore, it is probably advisable not to work on the basis that a RSLs will be declared not to be public bodies for the purposes of the GDPR.

Another possible implication for RSLs is in relation to the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (“the EIRs”).  The Scottish Information Commissioner has already previously decided that RSLs are public authorities for the purpose of these regulations, which govern access to environmental information.  The Housing (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill may have implications for the basis upon which the Commissioner concluded that RSLs were a public authority for the purposes of the EIRs.  If it does, there may be a gap where RSLs are not public authorities for the purposes of EIRs.  Once they become designated as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA, they will automatically become a public authority for the purposes of the EIRs as well.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance in respect of a freedom of information or data protection matter then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.

Compensation in Data Protection law

Section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998 makes provision for a data subject to raise court proceedings for payment of damages where there has been a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 which has caused them damage and/or distress.  The provisions in Section 13 have not been used as often as they might otherwise have; this may have been partly down to the way in which the legislation was initially drafted, but that was rectified (in England, at least) by the English Court of Appeal in Google Inc v Vidal-Hall and ors [2015] EWCA Civ 311.

The General Data Protection Regulation, which is due to become applicable in the UK from 25th May 2018, makes provision for data subjects to obtain compensation from controllers and processors in Article 82.  The right is for “any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of [the GDPR]” to be compensated.  Clause 159(1) of the Data Protection Bill (which is still in the early stages of the parliamentary process), provides that this “includes financial loss, distress and other adverse effects.”

A Data Subject is not limited to claiming compensation from the controller.  The GDPR provides that a processor will “be liable for the damage caused by processing only where it has not complied with the obligations…specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.”

Article 82(3) of the GDPR introduces a defence to such a claim for compensation, but it is an exceptionally high test.  No liability arises where the controller or processor “proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.”  The burden of proof falls on the controller or process and liability attaches even where the processor or controller is responsible for the event causing the damage in the most minor of ways.

The terms of Article 82(3) create joint and several liability for controllers and processors.  In a situation where multiple controllers and/or processors are all partially responsible for the event giving rise to the damage; the data subject could elect to sue any one of them (or indeed, all of them).  Where the data subject elects to sue just one controller/processor who is responsible, controller/processor is entitled to recover from the other controllers/processors “that part of the compensation corresponding to their part of responsibility for the damage.”

Where the data subject elects to sue more than one controller/processor then Recital 146 of the GDPR explains that, in accordance with Member State law, compensation may be apportioned by the court according to the responsibility of each controller or processor for the damage caused by the processing.

The GDPR does not stipulate any maximum amount of compensation that can be awarded to data subjects; however, Recital 146 of the GDPR explains that data subjects should receive full and effective compensation for the damage they have suffered.  Quite what “full and effective compensation” mean is something that will be worked out as the courts grapple with the new provisions.  There have been almost no published decisions from the Scottish courts in respect of claims for compensation under Section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998, but where there have been decisions the compensation awarded has not been particularly high.  For example, Sheriff Ross awarded the each of the Pursuers £8,364 in Woolley v Akbar [2017] SC Edin 7.  That case concerned the use of CCTV at private dwellings and the compensation figure was calculated on a nominal rate of £10 per day that the Defender was in breach of the Act.

The GDPR only applies to processing of personal data in areas which are within the competence of the European Union; however, the Data Protection Bill extends the scope of the GDPR to areas beyond the competence of the European Union.  Clause 160 of the Bill provides for compensation where it cannot be claimed under Article 82 and the clause mirrors the terms of Article 82.

In Scotland both the Sheriff Court and the Court of Session will have jurisdiction to hear claims under Article 82 of the GDPR and Clause 160 of the Data Protection Bill (as is the case with claims under Section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998).  In practice it is likely that the vast majority of claims will be heard in the Sheriff Court given that it is unlikely that any claim will exceed £100,000 and will therefore be within the privitive jurisdiction of the Sheriff Court.  However, with the advent of Group Proceedings (see Section 17 of the Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Bill [pdf]) it is possible the Article 82 claims will end up the Court of Session as the Bill only provides for a group proceedings procedure in the Court of Session.

Those who process personal data should be aware that the right of a data subject to claim compensation, whether that be under the Data Protection Act 1998, the GDPR or the Data Protection Bill (when it becomes an Act), arising out of a data protection breach is in addition to any enforcement action that the Information Commissioner takes, such as the issuing of an administrative fine.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like to pursue a claim for compensation for a data breach, or if you require to defend such a claim; or if you would like advice and assistance with any other Information Law matter we would be pleased to hear from you. You can contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.