Tag Archives: Access to Information

Dealing with vexatious FOI Requests

The call for views by the Public Audit and Post-Legislative Scrutiny Committee of the Scottish Parliament (“the Committee”) in respect of its post-legislative scrutiny of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (“FOISA”) ended on 21 June 2019 (having been extended a couple of times). One of the issues that came up on a number of occasions in the Committee’s discussions and evidence sessions prior to formally deciding to undertake post-legislative scrutiny of FOISA was the issue of vexatious requests. This issue has come up again in a number of responses to the call for views provided by Scottish public authorities (but certainly not all those Scottish public authorities that submitted responses).

It does seem as though Scottish public authorities, generally, are fairly poor at utilising section 14 of FOISA, which provides that a Scottish public authority does not need to comply with a request for information where it is vexatious. The Scottish Information Commissioner has also expressed the view that authorities are not utilising the available provisions within FOISA to deal with vexatious requests, such as at an evidence session before the Committee on 10 January 2019 [pdf].

The response of by Glasgow City Council [pdf] provides an example of a single requester who has made around 100 FOI requests on a related topic. It strikes me that requests from this particular requester on this particular topic could very well fall within the ambit of section 14 (although, I make that comment with only that information which is available from Glasgow City Council in its response). While the law requires the request to be vexatious, rather than the requester themselves, it is permissible to look at the requester’s conduct towards, previous correspondence with and previous requests to the authority in determining whether a particular request that has come in is, in fact, vexatious. This is something that Scottish public authorities seem to struggle with and often seem look at a particular request in isolation and not necessarily consider the wider background and context.

The leading case on section 14 of FOISA, Beggs v Scottish Information Commissioner, was only decided at the end of 2018 and therefore prior to that there was no authoritative guidance on the application of section 14 of FOISA. However, the Scottish Information Commissioner and Scottish public authorities have looked to Dransfield v Information Commissioner to help with the application of section 14 of FOISA. In Beggs the Inner House of the Court of Session essentially approved of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dransfield. The decision in Beggs is, subject to any appeal to the UK Supreme Court, binding authority on the operation of section 14 of FOISA. Scottish public authorities can therefore look to both the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Dransfield and the opinion of Lord Brodie in Beggs for guidance on section 14 of FOISA and how to apply it in appropriate cases.

The Court of Appeal and the Inner House of the Court of Session have both stressed that the right of access to information is a constitutional one and so the bar for engaging section 14 is a high one. However, it is clear that the bar is not so high so as to be impossible to meet in practice.

Section 14 of FOISA allows Scottish public authorities to consider matters that would not normally be relevant to FOI requests, such as the identity of the requester and their motives. Scottish public authorities (and indeed, public authorities working under the Freedom of Information Act 2000) should remember that they can look at a requester’s motives; for example, a malicious motive can be an indicator that a request is vexatious (but is not necessarily evidence that the request is, in fact, vexatious): Beggs at paragraph 33. Equally, the absence of a malicious motivation is not necessarily evidence that the request is not vexatious.

A person’s previous dealings with an authority can be relevant as can their other FOI requests: if a person is showing signs of obsessive behaviour, then that could be an indicator that the request is vexatious. The authority needs to look at the request objectively, in the surrounding circumstances, and come to a judgement as to whether the request is vexatious. However, it will need to remember to have evidence to support its conclusion in case the requester makes an application to the Commissioner challenging the application of section 14 by the authority.

Perhaps there is concern within authorities about getting it wrong and having a section 14 refusal overturned by the Commissioner; however, we can only learn from doing and from our mistakes. There are 96 decision notices on the Scottish Information Commissioner’s website relating to section 14(1) of FOISA (the specific part of section 14 that deals with vexatious requests). This number does seem to be rather small given that wide opinion coming from Scottish public authorities over many years that vexatious requests are a particular problem. Over 50 of those decision notices find entirely in favour of the authority and a good number are classified as partially upheld (many of which appear to have included technical defaults by the authority). It is clear that where a Scottish public authority appropriately deploys section 14 in respect of vexatious requests, the Commissioner will uphold that decision.

It certainly does seem to be the case that Scottish public authorities are reticent to utilise section 14 of FOISA. Perhaps, it is because they do not fully understand the scope of section 14 or are unsure about its precise application – it can potentially be used in a wide variety of circumstances. Scottish public authorities could certainly be using section 14 much more frequently than what they are at present and they should seek to become much more confident in using section 14. Indeed, a majority of the examples that I have seen emanate from Scottish public authorities, which they put forward as examples of problems that they are facing which cannot be dealt with by the application of section 14; most probably could, in fact, have been dealt with by the application of section 14. The same level of reluctance is not obviously present in respect of those authorities subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Alistair Sloan

If you are a requester or a public authority who would like advice or assistance in regards to freedom of information law then contact our team on 0141 229 0880 or by E-mail. We are also able to assist with a range of other information law matters.

Scottish Vexatiousness

Paragraph numbers in this blog post relate to the Court of Session’s decision in Beggs v Scottish Information Commissioner [2018] CSIH 80; unless the context requires, or it is expressly stated, otherwise.

If you’re regularly involved in the making of or responding to freedom of information requests then you are likely to be familiar with the decision of the English and Welsh Court of Appeal in Dransfield and Another v The Information Commissioner and another which deals with the meaning and application of “vexatious” within section 14 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). In keeping with many of the provisions of FOIA, there has been considerable litigation on section 14 within the First-Tier Tribunal; however, the decision in Dransfield is the leading authority on the approach that public authorities, the UK Information Commissioner and the First-Tier and Upper Tribunals should take when applying or considering the exemption in section 14(1) of FOIA.

As with many aspects of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, the equivalent provisions within FOISA (also section 14) have escaped any judicial consideration; that is, until today when the First Division,  Inner House of the Court of Session (Lord President Carloway and Lords Brodie and Drummond Young) advised its opinion in an appeal under section 56 of FOISA against a decision of the Scottish Information Commissioner which upheld the decision of the Scottish Prison Service that a request for information made to it was vexatious: Beggs v Scottish Information Commissioner [2018] CSIH 80.

As with most cases involving vexatious requests, there is a history to the matter; this is briefly set out in paragraphs 5-15 of the Court’s Opinion. I am therefore not going to set it out here. There were two grounds of appeal advanced on behalf of the Appellant before the Court and these are set out, in full, by the Court in paragraph 4 of its Opinion. The grounds can  be summarised as follows: (1) that the test set out by Arden LJ (as she then was) in Dransfield should apply and that it had been incorrectly applied by the Scottish Information Commissioner (“SIC”); and (2) that the SIC’s decision was irrational as it failed to take into account a number of factors. The court ultimately rejected both grounds of appeal and refused the Appeal.

The Court makes some “preliminary comment” about the English and Welsh Court of Appeal’s decision in Dransfield. It notes that the decision is “an English case concerning English legislation” (para 26). This is not a wholly accurate statement by the Court: Dransfield concerns section 14 of FOIA, which cannot properly be said to be English legislation. FOIA covers UK-wide public bodies (such as UK Government departments, the BBC, UCAS, the British Transport Police and other); it can be used by people living in Scotland. There is also no separate Norther Irish FOI law and FOIA applies to bodies such as departments of the Northern Irish Government and the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it is possible for appeals against the Upper Tribunal to be taken to the Court of Session and the UK Commissioner can, for example, under section 54, make certifications to the Court of Session.

It appears that what the Court meant by “English legislation” is that the decision in Dransfield was not binding upon the SIC as the SIC is concerned with the enforcement of FOISA – an Act of the Scottish Parliament – rather than FOIA – an Act of the UK Parliament. I may, of course, be entirely wrong and the Court of Session has fundamentally misunderstood FOIA and the distinction between FOIA and FOISA. However, this is not really a matter upon which anything of substance in Beggs can be said to turn. It appears that the Court has essentially adopted the reasoning of Arden LJ and supplemented it with some of its own.

Also by way of preliminary comment the Court notes that Arden LJ expressly declined to offer a definition of or test for “vexatious” or “vexatiousness” (para 26) and so it was incorrect to argue that Dransfield set out a “test” for vexatious requests. The court went on (also at para 26) to state that “[i]t would be remarkable if the word “vexatious” when found in section 14(1) of the English Act of 2000 meant something different from the same word when found in section 14(1) of the Scottish Act of 2002; the terms of the two subsections are essentially identical.”

However, the Court of Session found that there was much in the judgment of Arden LJ that they would agree with and quote paragraph 68 of the judgment of Arden LJ with approval. The Court of Session, perhaps importantly, appears to have approved of the view that Arden LJ took that the rights in FOIA were constitutional in nature (para 28). The court also held that when assessing whether a request is vexatious or not, it must be viewed objectively. In the decision under challenge, the SIC had concluded that when viewed objectively the information sought was of no value to the Appellant. The First Division held that had the SIC followed Dransfield (which she was not obliged to do so) then she would have correctly reached the same conclusion: that Mr Beggs’ request was vexatious (para 30).

In terms of the irrationality ground of appeal, this was dealt with more swiftly by the Court. Counsel for the Appellant had characterised the three matters which the Appellant argued had been overlooked by the Court, were material.

The first matter was the Appellant’s express disavowal of any direct and personal attack. The Appellant had expressly disavowed in his request that there was any such attack. However, the Solicitor Advocate for the SIC argued that the contents of a letter sent to one of the SIC’s officers revealed the Appellant’s purpose; the Appellant’s purpose was “not to obtain information as such” (para 33) rather it was with a view to pursuing complaints about their conduct.” (also at para 33).

The court held that “the presence of a malicious motive may point to a request being vexatious the absence of a malicious motive does not point to a request not being vexatious” (para 33). In essence, while the Court appears to have been sceptical of the Appellant’s express disavowal of personal attack it seems that even if it had not been sceptical, the disavowal may not have assisted the Appellant anyway. The Court again expressed the objective nature of assessing whether a request is vexatious and agreed with the SIC that a request may be harassing even if that is not what is intended by the requester.

The second consideration referred to the past conduct of the authority; these requests appear to have been the result of the Scottish Prison Service putting forward inaccurate information in earlier proceedings before the Court of Session. The Court approved of the view of Arden LJ in respect of vengeful motives – such a motive might itself be an indicator that a request is vexatious. The court’s position here is fairly broad, but it does not appear to close off legitimate use of FOISA to uncover evidence of wrongdoing within a Scottish public authority. However, it is fairly clear that if a requester is using

The third consideration related to the importance of the information requested; the court concluded that the information was objectively of no value and this was therefore not a material consideration.

Comment
This is the first time that the vexatious requests provision in FOISA has been considered by the Scottish courts and will now be the leading case in applying section 14(1) of FOISA. The decision essentially approves of the approach set out by the English and Welsh Court of Appeal in Dransfield. It is important to remember that a request must be considered objectively. There is no express test for vexatious requests either under FOIA or FOISA, but it will be important for Scottish public authorities to keep in mind the constitutional nature of the rights in FOISA. With this in mind, the threshold for applying the provision in section 14(1) of FOISA is a high one.

The Court of Session considers that, when Arden LJ used the phrase “no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value”, it appears that Arden LJ was trying to encapsulate an idea of “gross disproportion as between much trouble inevitably caused and little benefit possibly gained.” How much traction this comment of the Court of Session will have in terms of the application of section 14 of FOIA (given that the Court of Session’s judgments in FOISA cases are of only persuasive authority to the Tribunals and English and Welsh Courts) remains to be seen. Of course, should Beggs seek permission (and be granted permission) to appeal to the Supreme Court we may get a definitive view from(the now)  Lady Arden on whether the Court of Session has correctly interpreted what she meant when sitting in the English and Welsh Court of Appeal.

For the time being, whether or not the Court of Session was right in what it said, this is now (subject to any appeal) the law as it applies in Scotland vis-à-vis FOISA. When considering whether a requester has a reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value, it is necessary to look (objectively) at what value there is in the information (a mere assertion by the Applicant that it is of value will not itself be sufficient) and balance that against the inevitable burden that answering the request will place on the authority: they are inversely proportional to one another.

From the perspective of requesters, it is likely to be of little assistance to include express statements in requests that the request is not a personal attack on the authority or a member of its staff and even if you have no intent to cause harassment your request might well have that effect. Your request will be considered objectively in light of its facts and circumstances (and comments made in later correspondence may well be seen as tending to show the opposite).

The decision in Beggs is not likely to have much, if any, impact upon the way in which the vexatious requests provisions in FOISA operate in practice. The Court has essentially approved of the approach to the identical provisions under FOIA. In the absence of any previous authority from the Scottish courts in respect of section 14, the SIC and Scottish public authorities have historically found Dransfield to be persuasive and used it as a basis for understanding what section 14 means.

In short, to decide whether a request is vexatious it is necessary to consider the request objectively on its own facts and circumstances. There is no formula or checklist that can be followed which will give you a definitive answer.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance in respect of a Freedom of Information matter or a data protection/privacy issue then contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 229 0880 or you can send him an E-mail.

Crossroads: where data protection and freedom of information intersect

The laws relating to freedom of information and those relating to privacy and data protection often come into conflict with one another.  One issue which arises often for those who are responsible for answering freedom of information requests is whether or not to disclose personal data of third parties which is caught up within the information that has been requested.  This is an area that has been the subject of much litigation both under the Scottish and UK FOI laws; indeed, cases have gone from Scotland all the way to the UK Supreme Court (this might be because there are fewer levels of appeal to go through in Scotland and until very recently Scottish litigants did not need the permission of the Court of Session or the Supreme Court to take an appeal there).

One area which is perhaps the most contentious of all is where the personal data in question relations to civil servants.  The generally accepted position has been that in most cases the personal data of junior civil servants will be redacted while personal data relating to senior civil servants is more likley to be disclosed.  This position, however, is one that has never really had any scrutiny from the superior courts; that is until now.  On 6th April the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) made its decision in Cox v Information Commissioner and Home Office [2018] UKUT 119 (AAC).  Judge Wikeley records that to the best of his knowledge Cox was “the first occasion on which the Upper Tribunal has had to consider in any depth the issue of the principles governing the disclosure of the names of individual civil servants in response to a request under FOIA.” [32]

In this appeal the Appellant, Mr Cox, is concerned with the development of Government policy and its application in relation to migration from the Horn of Africa.  The Appellant made a request for information to the Home Office pursuant to his right of access to information within the Freedom of Information Act 2000.  His request for information sought details concerning meetings between civil servants from the Home Office and government officials from countries within the region.  In particular, the Appellant sought the dates of the meetings, names of all those who were present at the meetings and also the notes of such meetings.

There were two issues in the appeal, but this blog post only focuses on the first of those issues; that being the disclosure of the names of civil servants.  The Home Office had refused to disclose the names of three civil servants who had formed part of the UK’s delegation to Eritrea in December 2014 (they were referred to as J, L and N during the course of the proceedings before the First-Tier Tribunal).  The Information Commissioner had agreed with the Home Office and found that the Home Office had complied with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in withholding the names under section 40(2) of the Act.

The UK and Scottish provisions in respect of personal data are the same (although, in the Scottish Act the exemption can be found within section 38 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002).  Personal data of third parties is exempt under FOI law where to release the personal data would amount to a breach of the data protection principles.  When third party personal data is involved in an FOI request the sixth condition in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 1998 comes into play.  This condition requires there to be a balancing exercise undertaken between the rights of the data subject and the rights of the person who is seeking disclosure of the personal data.

In South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55 (a case which involved the disclosure of pay scales within the Council in connection with matters concerning equal pay), Lady Hale observed that the sixth condition in Schedule 2 required that three discrete questions are asked and answered:

  1. Is the data controller or the third party or parties who whom the data are disclosed pursuing a legitimate interest of interests?
  2. Is the processing involved necessary for the purpose of those interests?
  3. Is the processing unwarranted in the circumstances by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject?

The first hurdle for a requester to get across in seeking to have third party personal data, including the names of civil servants, disclosed under FOI laws is that they are pursuing a legitimate interest. It is clear from the authorities that there is no inherent interest in the release of civil servants’ names: “[t]here is no reason why the general transparency values underpinning FOIA should automatically create a legitimate interest in disclosure under the DPA.” [42] (see also Department of Health v Information Commissioner and Lewis [2017] EWCA Civ 374)  What needs to be assessed is “the legitimate interests of the individual requester, and not the more abstract legitimate interests of the public at large”. [43]  If the decision-maker, whether that be the public authority, commissioner or courts/tribunals, is not satisfied that there is no legitimate interest being pursued by the requester, then they do not need to go any further as the sixth condition would not apply (see the comments of Judge Jacobs giving the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Information Commissioner v (1) CF and (2) Nursing and Midwifery Council [2015] UKUT 449 (AAC) at paragraph 19 in particular).

When the personal data exemptions are in play they represent an exception to the general proposition that the FOI process is applicant blind (i.e. that the applicant doesn’t play a part in determining whether information ought to be released or not); other exceptions include, for example, the vexatious provisions and the aggregation provisions within the appropriate limit regulations.  Judge Jacobs, at paragraph 30, in IC v CF & NMC (above) said that it “is impossible to apply paragraph 6(1) without having regard to the identity of the applicant, the interest pursued by the request and the extent to which information is already potentially available to the public.”

Each case will, of course, turn on its own facts.  Many of the factors which go into determining whether third party personal data ought to be released is specific to the facts and context. However, I suggest that we can draw some clear principles from the case law to date:

  1. When determining the legitimate interests part of the test; there is no public benefit legitimate interest – reference must be had to who is making the request and why they are making the request;
  2. The balancing exercise required to be undertaken when applying condition 6 of Schedule 2 is not the same balancing exercise that is completed when undertaking the public interest balancing exercise;
  3. FOI rights do not take precedence over privacy and data protection rights;
  4. When it comes to the personal data of civil servants; there is no hard rule that the personal data (including names) of senior civil servants will always be disclosed and likewise there is no hard rule that the personal data (including names) of junior civil servants will always be redacted; it is a decision that is both fact-specific and context-specific

The decision in Cox is of course one that is not binding on the Scottish Information Commissioner, but it is binding upon the First-Tier Tribunal and the UK Information Commissioner.  It essentially approves of the way in which public authorities and both commissioners have been handling these issues to date and so we’re unlikely to see anything change as to how the tension between FOI laws and the data protection laws is resolved.

The Data Protection Bill will (when it is finally passed and eneacted) amend both the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 to reflect the General Data Protection Regulation; the provisions look a bit unwieldy, but in reality they are unlikely to change very little in terms of day-to-day practice.

Alistair Sloan

If you require advice and assistance on any aspect of freedom of information or data protection and privacy law then you can contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 229 0880; alternatively you can contact him directly be E-mail.  We have a Twitter account dedicated to information law issues , which you are welcome to follow.

The National Security Blanket has been Shrunk

On 2nd January 2018 the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) (consisting of Charles J, Lane J and Anne Chafer)  published an important decision [pdf], dated 14th December 2017, on the application of the exemption in section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

The exemption in section 23 relates to information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.  Subsection (3) provides a list of 15 bodies to which the exemption applies; including the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).  The actual exemption is contained in Section 23(1) and provides that:

Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Background

The decision is worth reading in full, but the essential background to the decision is as follows.  On 21st August 2015 the Royal Air Force carried out a precision air strike in Syria utilising a remotely piloted aircraft (commonly referred to as a ‘drone strike’).  The strike took place in the Syrian city of Raqqa and the target was 21 year-old Reyaad Khan, who was born in Cardiff, and had featured in a ‘recruitment video’ produced by ISIS (also known as IS, Dahesh or ISIL).  The strike killed the intended target along with two other ISIS fighters, one of whom was also British.

On 7th September 2015 the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, made a statement to the House of Commons.  In his statement to the House, Mr. Cameron provided details on the operation which had taken place in August 2015 in Raqqa.  The Upper Tribunal’s written reasons for its decision quote extensively, at paragraph 10, from Mr. Cameron’s statement to the House.  It also quotes an exchange between Mr. Cameron and the then acting leader of the Labour Party, Harriet Harman MP (paragraphs 11 and 12).

In compliance with the United Kingdom’s obligations in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the UK’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations wrote to the President of the Security Council informing the President that the UK had undertaken the 25th August 2015 operation and that this was in “exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.”  The Upper Tribunal have quoted further from that letter in paragraph 13 of its decision.

There is much more to the background which can be dealt with in this blog post; however, it is comprehensively set out in the Upper Tribunal’s decision.  It is suffice to say that Freedom of Information requests were made by the appellants to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and to the Cabinet Office.  These requests were refused by the public authorities and, in three decisions dated 30 August 2016, the Information Commissioner upheld the decisions of the AGO and the Cabinet Office.  The appellants appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) and the appeals were transferred to the Upper Tribunal in terms of Rule 19 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (general regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 – which allows appeals to the First-Tier Tribunal against decisions of the Information Commissioner’s office, amongst others, to be transferred to and be determined by the Upper Tribunal instead of the First-Tier Tribunal; essentially the appeal ‘leap-frogs’ the First-Tier Tribunal.

Section 23 of FOIA

Section 23 of FOIA is an absolute exemption, which means that it is not necessary for the public authority to consider where the public interest rests between maintaining the exemption and disclosure.  It was designed to ensure that there was no backdoor route to gaining access to information held by the security services under FOIA.  The security services are not public authorities for the purposes of FOIA and this exemption ensures that information which is supplied by, or relates to, one of the security bodies in section 23 cannot be obtained from a public body which is a public authority for the purposes of FOIA.  A similar exemption, but not identical, can be found at Section 31 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.

The Upper Tribunal’s decision

The Tribunal’s starting position seems to have been that FOIA provides a right of access to information rather than documents.  When responding to an FOI request, a public authority does not need to supply a copy of the document which contains the requested information (although, in practice an authority will provide the document – redacted where necessary).  The request can be complied with by extracting the information from the document or other records held by the authority (APPGER v ICO and FCO [2015] UKUT 0377 (AAC)).  This seems to be a key pillar of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Corderoy and another v The Information Commissioner and others.

The Upper Tribunal has in this case qualified a statement that was made in the decision of the Upper Tribunal in the APPGER case.  In the APPGER case, the Upper Tribunal stated that “…information, in a record supplied to one or more of the section 23 bodies for the purpose of the discharge of their statutory functions, is highly likely to be information which relates to an intelligence or security body and so exempt under section 23.”  The Respondents in the present case appear to have relied upon this position to argue for a very broad interpretation of section 23.  The Appellants however argued that the absolute exemption in section 23 would prevent disclosure under FOISA unless:  (a) the legal analysis to found the view that he policy decision was lawful can be disaggregated and provided in an intelligible form; and (b) any such disaggregated information falls outside the scope of section 23.

The Appellants were interested in the legal advice which underpinned the Government’s policy decision.  They argued that if this information could property be removed from the documents supplied to the section 23 bodies, and that information itself was not provided by, or related to, a section 23 body, then section 23 did not preclude disclosure and the information instead had to be considered under the qualified exemptions in sections 35(2) and 42 of FOIA (relating to the formulation of government policy and legal advice).

The Upper Tribunal eventually concluded that, while the information in question was clearly of interest to the section 23 bodies; Parliament did not intend, when enacting Section 23(1), for the exemption to apply to information simply because it might be of interest to the section 23 bodies.  The information in question in the present case was concerned with, and confined to, the question as to whether the Government’s policy was lawful.

The Upper Tribunal then went on to consider the public interest arguments, deciding that the public interest rested in maintaining the alternative qualified exemptions rather than in disclosure.  The Upper Tribunal held that it was not necessary for the Government’s legal advice to be shared in order to enable a debate on the lawfulness of the Government’s position to take place; indeed, a considerable debate had already taken place on the issue without the information.

Criticism of the Information Commissioner’s Investigations

The Upper Tribunal also took issue with the way in which the Information Commissioner had conducted her investigations into the complaints made by each of the appellants.  The Information Commissioner had proceeded on the basis of assurances given by the AGO and the Cabinet Office that the information was exempt under section 23(1) of FOIA rather then exercise her statutory powers to require the AGO and Cabinet Office to provide her with the information in question for her consideration.

The Upper Tribunal was extremely critical of this approach by the Commissioner.  The Commissioner did modify her position before the Upper Tribunal; however, the Upper Tribunal remained extremely critical.  At paragraph 95 of its decision, the Upper Tribunal stated:

We acknowledge the resource difficulties of the Information Commissioner but we consider that the course adopted here of effectively permitting the other tow Respondents to be the decision-maker on the challenge to their stance of the application of the absolute exemption in section 23 is unfair.

The Upper Tribunal went on to state in paragraph 97 of its decision that:

If the relevant public authority wishes to avoid a consideration of the relevant documents and so information and disaggregation issues, we have not thought of any circumstances in which it could rely on an assurance rather than a certificate given pursuant to s. 23(2) that can be appealed under section 60.

A certificate under section 23(2) is signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that the information to which the certificate applies was directly or indirectly supplied by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in section 23(3) is conclusive evidence of that fact.  The conclusiveness of the certificate is, however, subject to section 60 of FOIA which allows the Commissioner or any requester who is affected by the certificate to appeal the certificate to the First-Tier Tribunal.  The Tribunal can, if it decides that the information in question is not covered by section 23(1), quash the certificate.

Such a certificate may not ultimately prevent the First-tier Tribunal from carrying out the exercise that the Upper Tribunal ultimately carried out in this case, but it does prevent the Commissioner from doing so as the Commissioner is bound to rely upon such a certificate as being conclusive evidence of the application of section 23(1).

Comment

This was an important decision of the Upper Tribunal which clarifies the scope of Section 23(1) of FOIA and which also makes it clear how the Commissioner should conduct her investigations where a requester is challenging the application of section 23(1) of FOIA, but where no Minister of the Crown has signed a certificate pursuant to Section 23(2) of FOIA.

The Upper Tribunal has provided for a more defined exemption rather than for the blanket approach that was being taken by the Respondents.  What can be taken from this case is that information which may be of interest to those bodies listed in section 23(3) of FOIA, and thereby relate to them, will not automatically engage the exemption in section 23.

The Upper Tribunal’s comments on the way in which the Information Commissioner conducted her investigations in relation to these complaints are also of note, and indeed of wider importance.  It is clear that the Upper Tribunal expects the independent regulator to be independent (perhaps not an unsurprising conclusion); in this case it appears that she did not act as independently as she should have.  It was not appropriate for the Commissioner to rely on assurances given by the public bodies concerned and she ought to have required that a copy of the disputed information be provided to her for her consideration or a certificate issued pursuant to section 23(2) of FOIA.  While sympathetic to the pressure on resources that the Commissioner was experiencing, this did not provide an excuse to her for failing to properly investigate an area of contention between the requesters and the public authorities (and indeed between the public authorities themselves, who arrived at the same conclusion but for different reasons).

Alistair Sloan

We have experience of appeals against decisions of the UK Information Commissioner to the First-Tier and Upper Tribunals and also of handling appeals against decisions of the Scottish Information Commissioner.  If you would like to discuss a Freedom of Information matter with Alistair Sloan then you can contact him on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

Registered Social Landlords and FOI

Yesterday, the Scottish Government began a consultation on legislation to formally designate Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) as Scottish public authorities for the purposes of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (“FOISA”).  The draft Order being consulted on proposes a commencement date of 1st April 2019.

This is not an unexpected development in the field of information law.  In December 2016 the Scottish Government consulted on the principle of designating RSLs as public authorities for the purposes of FOISA.  It has been widely anticipated that RSLs would be designated as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA.

A designation as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA will have ramifications for RSLs beyond the obvious need to comply with FOISA and being under the regulatory oversight of the Scottish Information Commissioner.  It will also have implications for RSLs in respect of how they implement the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which becomes applicable from 25th May 2018.

There are a number of aspects of the GDPR which are directed towards public bodies.  The Data Protection Bill currently before the UK Parliament defines what a public body is for the purposes of the GDPR.  Clause 6 of the Bill provides that a body which is designated as a Scottish public authority for the purposes of the FOISA is a public body.  This will mean that RSLs will have to appoint a Data Protection Officer; even although many of them would not have had to before this decision was taken by the Scottish Government.

It also has implications for the grounds upon which they can legitimately process personal data.  Processing of personal data for the purpose of pursuing a legitimate interest of the controller is permissible under the GDPR.  However, the GDPR goes on to provide that public bodies cannot rely upon legitimate interest as a ground of processing in performance of their tasks.  Therefore, any RSL that has been preparing for the GDPR on the basis that they will be able to process personal data on the legitimate interests ground will have to re-evaluate its processing of personal data ahead of its designation as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA.

It is worthy of note, simply for interest, that the Data Protection Bill proposes giving the Secretary of State the power to make regulations which state that a public body is not in fact a public body for the purposes of the GDPR.  However, there has been no indication that the Secretary of State intends on making use of this power or how the power is intended to be used; therefore, it is probably advisable not to work on the basis that a RSLs will be declared not to be public bodies for the purposes of the GDPR.

Another possible implication for RSLs is in relation to the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (“the EIRs”).  The Scottish Information Commissioner has already previously decided that RSLs are public authorities for the purpose of these regulations, which govern access to environmental information.  The Housing (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill may have implications for the basis upon which the Commissioner concluded that RSLs were a public authority for the purposes of the EIRs.  If it does, there may be a gap where RSLs are not public authorities for the purposes of EIRs.  Once they become designated as a public authority for the purposes of FOISA, they will automatically become a public authority for the purposes of the EIRs as well.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance in respect of a freedom of information or data protection matter then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.

FOISA Vexatious decision notice appealed to Court of Session

Section 14 in both the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (“FOISA”) enable an authority not to comply with a request for information that is vexatious.  What is meant by vexatious in Section 14 of FOIA has been the subject of litigation all the way to the Court of Appeal and the leading authority is Dransfield and another v The Information Commissioner and others [2015] EWCA Civ 454; [2015] 1 WLR 5316.  However, there has not yet been any litigation in Scotland on the meaning of vexatious within Section 14 of FOISA; the Scottish Information Commissioner’s guidance [pdf] on the subject appears to draw heavily on the Dransfield decision.

Those who make a point of reading the Scottish Information Commissioner’s regular round-ups of decisions will note that the most recent one informs us of an appeal to the Court of Session against a decision of the Scottish Information Commissioner which upheld the authority’s use of Section 14.  If the appeal proceeds, it will be the first time that the Scottish courts will have considered Section 14 of FOISA.

It will be interesting to see whether the Court of Session adopts the Dransfield position, or whether it takes a different approach to vexatious requests in Scotland.  If the Court of Session does publish an Opinion, we will of course cover it on this blog.

Alistair Sloan

We are able to provide advice and assistance in connection with a range of Freedom of Information matters, including appeals against decisions of both the Scottish and UK Information Commissioners.  If you would like to do discuss a Freedom of Information, or any other Information Law, matter with us then you can contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.

More is less and less is more

On 30th October 2017 the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) promulgated its decision in McGoldrick v The Information Commissioner; the Tribunal’s decision made two points which it is worth considering.  The request for information in question was made to HM Treasure concerning the Mersey Tunnels; the full terms of the request for information are set out in the Tribunal’s decision.

The first point relates to the use of section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 where some of the information that may fall within the scope of the request is likely to be environmental information; and the second is on the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance.

On the first issue, the Tribunal (at paragraph 12) states that it

“agrees with the Information Commissioner that the appellant’s request could cover both non-environment and environmental information, for the purposes of regulation 2(1)(c) but that it would defeat the purpose behind section 12 and regulation 12(4)(d) if a public authority were obliged to collate the requested information in order to ascertain what information fell under either FOIA or the EIR. We agree, therefore, that HM Treasury was correct to consider the request under section 12, even though it might include some environmental information.”

The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate for an authority to not separately identify environmental information and deal with that under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 where there is a substantial volume of information which covers both environmental and non-environmental information.  It seems that the Tribunal is of the view that there is no need to issue a refusal notice citing Regulation 12(4)(b) [although the Tribunal refers to Regulation 12(4)(d), but this seems as though it may be a typographical error] where a request is going to exceed the appropriate limit and it is likely that there is going to be environmental information within the ambit of the request.

On the second issue, the Tribunal decided that, on the facts of the present case, that HM Treasure did not comply with its obligation to provide adequate advice and assistance and overturned the Commissioner’s decision that it had.  In this case, HM Treasure told the requester that he might like to consider refining his request by reducing the amount of information requested.  The Commissioner considered that such a suggestion was sufficient in order to discharge the authority’s duty to provide advice and assistance.

At paragraph 18 of the Tribunal’s decision it stated:

“Given the widespread nature of computer-driven searches for information in connection with FOIA requests, it is, we consider, reasonable to expect large, sophisticated organisations, such as HM Treasury, to point out to requesters how the most thorough search is likely to exceed the relevant financial limit under the Regulations made by reference to section 12, and to suggest a reformulation of the request in terms specific to computerised searches. Accordingly, if HM Treasury had asked the appellant to reformulate his request by reference to emails and documents containing both the terms “Mersey tunnel” and “toll”, the appellant may well have reformulated his request.”

The Tribunal appears to be suggesting that a large public authority may have to go a bit further than a smaller authority in order to discharge its duty to provide advice and assistance.  It appears that, in certain cases, it may be necessary for a public authority to not only suggest that a requester reformulate their request but rather to go further and actually suggest ways in which it could be reformulated; especially when computer-driver searches for information are involved.

This certainly does fit with the way in which the legislation has been drafted; Section 12(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does include “so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so” within its terms.  So, where an authority is issuing a refusal notice under Section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 authorities, especially larger ones, ought to consider whether they are capable of suggesting how a request could be refined, not just that the requester may wish to consider refining it.

Alistair Sloan

We are able to provide advice and assistance in connection with a range of Freedom of Information matters, including appeals against decisions of both the Scottish and UK Information Commissioners.  If you would like to do discuss a Freedom of Information, or any other Information Law, matter with us then you can contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.

FOI in Scotland in 2016/17: The Scottish Information Commissioner’s Annual Report

Margaret Keyes, Acting Scottish Information Commissioner chose yesterday, International Right to Know Day, to launch her office’s annual report [pdf] for the 2016/17 year.  The report finds that the public’s awareness of the right to ask and obtain information from public bodies is high, at 85%.

The Scottish Information Commissioner is a statutory office holder charged with enforcing the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 and the INSPIRE (Scotland) Regulations 2009.  The Commissioner’s office, amongst other things, investigates complaints made by individuals and organisations who have exercised their rights under these various pieces of legislation, but who are dissatisfied with how the Scottish public authority has handled their request.

In 2016/17 the Commissioner received a total of 425 appeals and issued a total of 252 formal, legally enforceable, decision notices.  Most of the appeals received related to requests made under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 with the remainder relating to requests which fell to be dealt with under the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004.  The Commissioner received no appeals under the INSPIRE (Scotland) Regulations 2009 (although these Regulations are much more specialised and are probably only really of interest/relevance to a limited number of people).

There lies a right to appeal against formal notices issued by the Commissioner, including a formal decision notices, to the Court of Session.  A very small number of appeals were made to the Court of Session during the 2016/17 year, according to the Commissioner’s report (some of which Inksters were instructed in by the Appellant).

The Commissioner has a range of enforcement tools which can be deployed.  One of those is to issue an ‘enforcement notice’ which requires a Scottish public authority to take specified steps to comply with the legislation.  In 2016/17, the Commissioner issued four enforcement notices (which represented the first enforcement notices ever issued by the Commissioner).

Where the Commissioner reasonably requires information in order to (a) assess whether a Scottish public authority has complied, or is complying, with the legislation; or (b) assess whether a Scottish public authority has complied, or is complying, with the statutory codes of practice issued by the Scottish Ministers, the Commissioner can issue an Information Notice.  In 2016/17, the Commissioner issued 3 such notices.

The Commissioner’s decision notices are legally enforceable and where the Commissioner considers that a Scottish public authority is failing to comply with a decision notice the Commissioner has the power to certify this to the Court of Session.  The Court can ultimately, after making enquiries, deal with a Scottish public authority which has failed to comply with a decision notice as if they were in contempt of Court.  The Commissioner has never made such a certification, but the 2016/17 annual report reveals that the Commissioner came close to doing so during the course of that year.

On the whole it seems to have been a busy year for the Scottish Information Commissioner’s Office; although, the number of appeals received in 2016/17 was lower than in 2015/16.

Alistair Sloan

We are able to provide advice and assistance in connection with a range of Freedom of Information matters, including appeals against decisions of both the Scottish and UK Information Commissioners.  If you would like to do discuss a Freedom of Information, or any other Information Law, matter with us then you can contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.

Welcome to the Information Law Blog by Inksters Solicitors

Welcome to the Information Law Blog from Inksters Solicitors.  On this blog we will be covering the latest issues in the areas of Data Protection/Privacy and also Freedom of Information.  Most of the contributions to this blog will be by Alistair Sloan, although there may be contributions from other members of the Inksters team from time to time.

Alistair is one our solicitors based in our Glasgow HQ; he offers legal services throughout Scotland in the field of information law, among others.   Alistair regulalry travels around Scotland and in particular visits our Caithness base in Wick on a frequent basis.  Alistair has been involved in the fields of freedom of information and data protection for a number of years, including prior to qualifying as a solicitor, and has built up a knowledge base on both areas throughout that time.  While studying for his Master of Laws degree, he researched the Information Commissioner’s use of Monetary Penalty Notices for breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998.

The area of information law is constantly developing.  The biggest change on the horizon is the General Data Protection Regulation, which will be applicable in the UK (and across the rest of the European Union) from 25 May 2018.  This new Regulation from the European Union represents the single biggest change to the laws relating to data protection and privacy in the UK in more than 20 years.

Much of the field of Information law is governed by EU law in one way or another, whether it be data protection or access to environmental information held by public authorities; therefore, the hot political subject of Brexit will feature heavily in the information law field over the coming years.

We’re not new to the world of information law; in 2016 our Sylvia MacLennan acted for the successful Petitioner in WF v Scottish Ministers.  This case challenged the position in Scotland where an accused person could seek access to the medical records of a complainer in a criminal case, but that the complainer was said not to have any standing to make representations directly to the court (including through their own solicitor) on the question of whether their medical records should be disclosed to the accused.  It also challenged the lack of availability of legal aid in Scotland to complainers concerning such issues.

We hope that this blog will become a useful resource for individuals to find out about the latest developments in the field of information law.  To keep up to date with this blog and what we are doing you can follow Alistair on twitter here; we also have a dedicated information law twitter account, which you can follow as well.

If you want to discuss an information law matter with Alistair you contact him on 0345 450 0123 or by completing the form on the contact page of this blog.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail directly.