Tag Archives: Article 8

Privacy v Freedom of Expression in the Court of Appeal

Last year, Mr Justice Arnold gave judgment in the interesting case of Ali & Aslam v Channel 5 Broadcasting. This case concerned the fly-on-the wall programme broadcast on Channel 5 called “Can’t Pay? We’ll take it away”; which follows the work of High Court Enforcement Officers as they enforce court orders relating to debt and housing matters. Mr Justice Arnold found Channel 5 to be liable to the Claimants in the sum of £10,000 each; holding that the Claimant’s rights to privacy outweighed the rights of Channel 5 in respect of freedom of expression and the public interest.

Both parties appealed to the England and Wales Court of Appeal; Channel 5 on the issue of liability and the Claimants on the grounds that the damages awarded were insufficient. In a judgment given on 16^th April 2019, the Court of Appeal (Irwin LJ, Newey LJ and Baker LJ) refused both appeals.

The Court of Appeal addressed the issue of liability first, before dealing with the appeal on quantum (the amount of damages awarded). The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether Arnold J had gone beyond what was justified in balancing the Claimants’ rights to privacy against Channel 5’s rights to freedom of expression; and as a consequence had made an error of law. The Court of Appeal held that Arnold J had taken “too narrow a view of what was in the public interest, effectively confining it to the High Court Process.” [74] The Court considered that Arnold J was wrong to conclude “that the publication of each specific piece of information in respect of which the Claimants had a legitimate expectation of privacy had to be justified as a matter of general public interest.” [74]

An interference with privacy which cannot be justified (logically or rationally) by reference to the public interest served by publication cannot be rendered lawful by editorial discretion. However, where there is a rational view by which publication can be justified in the public interest the courts should be slow to interfere, giving full weight to editorial discretion and knowledge.

Despite having some reservations about the treatment of the public interest issues in the judgment from Arnold J (in particular, the narrow approach taken to the public interests issues which arose), the Court refused the cross-appeal by Channel 5. The court had three principal reasons for doing so, set out in paragraphs 92-94 of its judgment. Those can be summarised as follows:

Arnold J was clearly well aware of the relevant legal principles set out in the applicable case law.
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that Arnold J was fully aware of the range of public interest issues raised in the programme; and
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that while another judge might have reasonably found against the Claimants, it was not unreasonable for Arnold J to have found in their favour.

Turning to the appeal on damages, the first ground of appeal advanced essentially amounted to one that the level of damages awarded to each Claimant did not reflect the scale and nature of the publication. The second ground is that the judge was wrong to take into account the publication of the postings by the Ahmeds when setting the awards of damages for the publications by the Defendant. The third ground is that the judge wrongly failed to take into account the impact of the programme on the Claimants’ children.

All three grounds of appeal in respect of quantum were refused by the Court of Appeal. In respect of ground 2, the Court of Appeal noted that “[i]t must be obvious that the distress attributable to the programme was reduced because a number of people within the Claimants’ community or network were already aware of the broad events from the postings”. In respect of ground 3, the Court of Appeal considered that Arnold J had taken into account t he potential impact on the Claimants’ children.

On ground 1, the Court of Appeal distinguished against damages awarded in the case of phone hacking and the present case. They did so on the basis that in t he hacking cases those responsible for the hacking knew full well what they were doing was illegal; however, in the present case Channel 5 had taken steps to ensure that they remained within the law; including obtaining expert legal opinion. Furthermore, in the circumstances it was appropriate for Mr Justice Arnold to make an award of damages in the round.

There is some helpful guidance from the Court of Appeal on the issue of quantum in respect of breaches of privacy in the media sphere. In assessing quantum it is possible to look at issues in the round and reach a global figure of damages, rather than awarding damages identifiable to each issue. Furthermore, damages for cases of this kind cannot be calculated mathematically. Finally, an appellate court should not seek to interfere with an assessment as to quantum unless the damages awarded are so high or so low as to be perverse.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance in connection with a privacy issue, or any other information law matter; contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 229 0880. You can also send him an E-mail.

Information Law Review of 2018

It does not seem as though it was a year ago since I sat down to write my review of Information Law in 2017 and to have a brief look ahead into 2018; but somehow we now appear to be in 2019. It was always going to be the case that 2018 was going to be a big year for information law; with the General Data Protection Regulation becoming applicable on 25^th May 2018. The 25^th May 2018 came and went without the millennium bug style apocalypse that seemed inevitable from the amount of sensationalist writing that was taking place in late 2017 and early 2018.

My review of 2017 started off with the English and Welsh High Court decision on vicarious liability for data protection breaches in Various Claimants v WM Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB). This case rumbled on in 2018 and it was considered by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal heard the appeal and (in remarkably quick time) dismissed the appeal. It is understood that Morrisons have sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court and if permission is granted it is possible that it will feature in a review of Information law in 2019.

In February, the English and Welsh High Court issued an interesting privacy judgment when it considered an action for compensation arising out of “Can’t Pay? We’ll Take it Away’; a fly-on-the wall documentary following High Court Enforcement Officers in their work enforcing court orders relating to debt and housing cases. The Court had the tricky job of balancing the privacy rights of individuals against the rights of television companies in respect of freedom of expression; however, the High Court decided that the balance in this particular case fell in favour of the claimant’s privacy rights. The High Court’s decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal; looking specifically at the issue of quantifying the level of damages. That appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal in early December and should provide useful guidance on calculating damages in the privacy sphere.

Facebook, Cambridge Analytical and Aggregate AIQ all featured quite heavily in 2018 in terms of privacy and data protection matters. Facebook was served with a monetary penalty in the amount of £500,000 for breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998 and Aggregate AIQ was also the recipient of the first Enforcement Notice under the Data Protection Act 2018 (which was narrowed in scope by the Information Commissioner following an appeal by AIQ; which was subsequently dropped). Facebook lodged an appeal against the Monetary Penalty Notice with the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) in November 2018. If and when a decision is reached by the Tribunal in respect of that appeal, it will feature on this blog.

Arising out of the same wide-ranging investigation by the ICO as the Facebook penalty and the AIQ Enforcement Notice was an Information Notice served on the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which was appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal by UKIP in July.

In April there was yet another important decision from the English and Welsh High Court in respect of Privacy and Data Protection. A little over four years after the European Court of Justice decision on the Right to Be Forgotten in Google Spain, Mr Justice Warby handed down his judgment in NT1 & NT2 v Google; this represented the first decision of a UK Court in respect of the Right to Be Forgotten. An appeal was lodged in respect of this case and was due to be heard just before Christmas; however, it was reported that the case was settled on the day of the appeal.

The issue of compensation to identifiable third parties in the context of data protection breaches was considered by the English and Welsh Court of Appeal. This case adds to the helpful privacy and data protection case law emanating from the English and Welsh courts.

Another interesting development that we saw during the course of 2018 was a director being disqualified indirectly in connection with privacy and data protection matters. It does show that directors can be held personally liable for privacy and data protection transgressions of limited companies. This was underlined by the amendments to the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 which now enable the Commissioner to serve a monetary penalty on directors (and others associated with companies) in certain circumstances.

In Scotland, the Court of Session made new rules which should make appealing decisions of the Scottish Information Commissioner in respect of requests for environmental information more financially viable.

Litigation in respect information law matters in Scotland remains limited. The majority of litigation on these areas arises out of England and Wales. Perhaps in 2019, we will begin to see more litigation in Scotland on information law matters. Hopefully the new rules in the Court of Session will see more appeals in respect of the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 and hopefully the introduction of Group proceedings in the Court of Session through the Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018 will help with an increase in data protection and privacy litigation in Scotland.

In terms of 2018 Scottish cases, not long before Christmas the Court of Session treated us to a judgment in an appeal concerning vexatious requests under the Freedom of Information Scotland Act 2002. Beggs v Scottish Information Commissioner considered the correct approach to be taken when applying section 14(1) of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.

Looking ahead to 2019; the big issue on the horizon is Brexit. Much of what is discussed on this blog as “information law” derives from European law and so Brexit will likely have an impact upon that. We are still unsure as to the terms that we will be leaving on. A withdrawal Agreement has been negotiated between the European Union and the United Kingdom; however, there is still a way to go with that – and it looks quite likely that the UK Parliament will rejected the Withdrawal Agreement in its current form. If we end up leaving with no Withdrawal Agreement in place then this will cause considerable difficulties for UK business which rely upon the transfer of personal data from elsewhere within the European Union; it will also cause problems for public bodies.

In terms of making the law work after Brexit, we were treated by the Government (in between Christmas and New Year) to a draft of The Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. These Regulations will make changes to the GDPR, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 in light of the United Kingdom no longer being a member of the European Union. I will, of course, look at these draft Regulations in more detail soon.

I will attempt to address information law matters as they unfold in 2019 on the Information Law Blog from Inksters Solicitors.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with Privacy and Data Protection matters or with UK and Scottish Freedom of Information requests contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 229 0880 or you can E-mail him.

Privacy v Freedom of Expression: ‘Can’t Pay? We’ll take it away’

Yesterday an interesting privacy judgment was handed down in the English High Court by Mr Justice Arnold. The Claimants, Shakir Ali and Shahinda Aslam, brought proceedings against Channel 5 Broadcast Limited (“Channel 5”) for breaching their privacy in using footage of their eviction in the defendants’ television programme, ‘Can’t Pay? We’ll take it away’.

‘Can’t Pay? We’ll take it away’ is an observational documentary series broadcast by Channel 5 which follows the work of High Court Enforcement Agents. The programme often features the evictions of tenants from residential premises by High Court Enforcement Agents and these agents pursuing debtors for the recovery of monies owed to their clients. At Paragraph 58 of his judgment, Mr Justice Arnold states that the production company “wanted to show how the process which courts provided for the enforcement of debts and the reclaiming of property from debtors and tenants actually operated within ordinary peoples’ lives. He particularly wanted to show how landlords and creditors could expedite enforcement by moving the process from the County Court to the High Court, and the effect of this.”

The Claimants argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that this had been breached. Meanwhile, the Defendants argued that the Claimants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Alternatively Channel 5 argued that if the Claimants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, that was defeated by the Defendants’ rights to freedom of expression when the two were balanced against one another. Channel 5 was responsible for selecting which enforcement actions that were filmed for the programme would actually appear in the television series.

On the day of the eviction, the Claimants were visited by two High Court Enforcement Agents; one of whom was in training and the other, Mr Paul Bohill, had more than 30 years’ experience as a High Court Enforcement Agent. Only the first claimant was in the property when the Agents, together with a television film crew, arrived at the property to effect the eviction. Certain information was supposed to be provided to those being filmed but the evidence proved that Mr Bohill actively prevented that information being given to the Claimants, even when the first claimant enquired about why it was being filmed. Mr Justice Arnold covers the events of the eviction of the claimants, in detail, in paragraphs 70 – 115 of his judgment.

On 17^th June 2015 the first claimant contacted the production company objecting to footage of his eviction being used in the television series. He was told that they [the production company] needed to get their facts straight with regards to his benefits, but that his objections would be passed onto Channel 5 who made decisions about broadcast.

At paragraph 169 of his judgment, Mr Justice Arnold states that in his “judgment the principal factors relied upon by the Claimants do lead to the conclusion that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information in question. The Programme was largely filmed in their home; it showed them being evicted without prior warning; it showed them in a state of shock and distress; it showed them being taunted by Omar Ahmed; and it was foreseeable that the broadcasting of the Program me would have an adverse effect on their children. I do not accept that the open justice principle means that the Claimants’ Article 8 rights were not engaged. Open justice means that Channel 5 was entitled to report the facts that the courts had made the Order for Possession and issued the Writ of Possession and in consequence the Claimants had been lawfully evicted; but what happened in their home on 2 April 2015 was not part of the proceedings. Nor do I consider that the broadcasting of the information was an inevitable consequence of the Claimants’ failure to comply with the Order for Possession. Nor do I accept that Mr Ali’s Article 8 rights were significantly weakened by his political activity. Mrs Aslam had not engaged in political activity at all. I accept that the Claimants, and their children, had already suffered damage to their privacy as a result of the Ahmeds’ postings on social media, but I do not accept that this meant that the broadcasting of Programme either could not or did not inflict further damage given the substantial scale and duration of the broadcasting.”

In respect of the argument advanced on behalf of Channel 5, that Mr Ali had consented to being filmed, Mr Justice Arnold states that the consent was not “true consent”, was “an agreement to participate under protest” and “was not fully informed agreement given that he was not told anything about the programme that was being filmed or who would broadcast it or about the body cameras.” (paragraph 177). In any event, Mr Justice Arnold held that “to the limited extent that he did give consent on 2 April 2015, he unequivocally withdrew that consent prior to the first broadcast of the Programme.” (paragraph 178).

Having found that the Claimants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, it became necessary for the court to balance that against Channel 5’s rights to freedom of expression. There was no dispute that there was a genuinely held belief by the production company and channel 5 that the programme was in the public interest; however, there was a dispute between the parties as to whether that was enough or whether it had to be assessed objectively. Mr Justice Arnold concluded that it was clear that the court had to assess it objectively.

Channel 5 argued that “the programme addressed a number of matters of real public interest and concern: increasing levels of personal debt, and in particular rent arrears of tenants in privately-rented accommodation; the dependence of tenants on benefits, and in particular housing benefit; the effect of enforcement of writs of possession by HCEAs; and the consequences for both landlords and tenants. He further submitted that it was justified for Channel 5 to illustrate these matters by showing what happened to real people in real situations, because that was the best way to engage the public and stimulate debate.”

At paragraph 195, Mr Justice Arnold concludes that “the Programme did contribute to a debate of general interest, but…the inclusion of the Claimants’ private information in the Programme went beyond what was justified for that purpose…The focus of the Programme was not upon the matters of public interest, but upon the drama of the conflict between Omar Ahmed [the landlord] and the Claimants. Moreover, that conflict had been encouraged by Mr Bohill…”

Mr Justice Arnold ultimately concluded that when balancing the rights of the Claimants to a private and family life against Channel 5’s rights to freedom of expression, the balance came down in favour of the Claimants’ Article 8 rights. Each claimant was ultimately awarded £10,000 in damages.

This case raises a number of questions about similar style programmes regularly broadcast on television in the United Kingdom. It is possible that Channel 5 might face claims from others featured in ‘Can’t Pay? We’ll take it away’ arising out of the publicity that this judgment has received. Of course, Channel 5 might well decide to appeal the decision; however, in the meantime broadcasters who broadcast similar style programmes and the production companies who make them ought to reflect upon the decision in the meantime and take it into account when making decisions about programming content of that nature. It is clear that individuals in these situations do have a reasonable expectation of privacy. There will be circumstances where the broadcasters’ freedom of expression will defeat the privacy rights of the individuals; however, there will need to be a genuine attempt to cover matters of public interest. If it is simply for the prupose of entertainment, then broadcasters could find themselves being sued for breach of privacy if they do not have informed consent from the individuals featured (or do not take steps to protect the identities of those featured).

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance in respect of a privacy/data protection issue or any other information law matter then contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

Information Law Review of 2017

2018 is now upon us and this is a big year in the field of Information Law, the General Data Protection Regulation will at last become applicable in the United Kingdom. If you are a data controller or a data processor, your preparations for the GDPR should be well under way; however, if you have not yet started to prepare for these regulations then it is not yet too late. The lesser known brother of the GDPR also kicks in this year, the Law Enforcement Directive, which governs the processing of personal data by law enforcement agencies.

However, before I get stuck into what is coming this year in the field of Information law, I want to take a moment to look back at some of the things that happened in 2017. At the tail end of 2017 the High Court in England issued its anticipated judgment in the case of Various Claimants v WM Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB). This represented a significant development in the data protection field and opens up a much wider range of circumstances in which data subjects can sue a data controller under Section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998.

In October 2017, the Irish High Court made a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union at the request of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner seeking a preliminary ruling on “Privacy Shield”, the successor to the Safe Harbour rules which had previously been held to be unlawful by the European Court.

In September 2017, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision concerning the application of the right to a private and family life contained in Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights to the monitoring of a person’s communications by their employer.

Also in September 2017, the UK Government published its Data Protection Bill which will replace the Data Protection Act 1998, extends GDPR standards to areas not within the competence of the European Union and implements the Law Enforcement Directive, among other things.

Now looking ahead to 2018, it is possible that we might see a decision from the English Court of Appeal in the Morrisons case referred to above, the judge having granted permission to Morrisons to appeal his findings in relation to vicarious liability. We may also see claims for compensation being made based upon the Morrisons decision.

In Scotland, we will be expecting to see some more progress made by the Scottish Parliament in its consideration of the Children and Young People (Information Sharing) (Scotland) Bill. I provided written evidence to the Education and Skills Committee on this Bill last year. The Committee has had some difficulty in completing its Stage 1 consideration of the Bill and the previous deadline of 22 November 2017 for completion of Stage 1 was removed by the Scottish Parliament.

It is also possible that we will see the Scottish Parliament’s Public Audit and Post-Legislative scrutiny Committee begin to undertake a post-legislative inquiry into the operation of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (or announce that such an inquiry will take place in due course). If such an inquiry does take place, it will be the first time that there will have been a complete review of the Scottish FOI Act and how it is operating.

Staying on the subject of Freedom of Information in Scotland, we are likely to see the outcome of the Scottish Information Commissioner’s formal intervention in respect of the Scottish Government’s compliance with the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002. We are also likley to see an Order being made under Section 5 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 designating Registered Social Landlords as scottish public authorities with effect from 1st April 2019.

By the end of 2018 we should also hopefully have a much better idea as to what the UK’s relationship with the European Union will be after it leaves, and in particular what impact this will have on data protection and privacy law in Scotland and the rest of the UK.

There will no doubt be a raft of new court decisions in relation to both Privacy/Data Protection and Freedom of Information over the course of the next 12 months and I will attempt to address the most important and unusual decisions here on the Information Law Blog from Inksters Solicitors.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice or assistance with Privacy and Data Protection matters (including GDPR preparation) or with UK and Scottish Freedom of Information requests contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or you can E-mail him.

Privacy and the Monitoring of Communications in the Employment Setting

On 5^th September 2017 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued its decision in the case of Bărbulescu v. Romania, which considers the application of the right to a private and family life contained in Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights to the monitoring of a person’s communications by their employer.

The background to the case is that an employee was dismissed by his employer for making use of company equipment and services (internet connection and computer) for personal purposes during working hours; in particular, he had been sending personal messages (some of which were of an “intimate nature”) to his brother and fiancée. The company’s internal policies prohibited this use and after following the disciplinary process required by Romanian domestic law, he was dismissed. He brought a case in the domestic courts and was unsuccessful in all of those courts. He then brought a case before the European Court of Human Rights which ultimately ended up with the Grand Chamber issuing its decision on 5^th September 2017. The procedural background to the case is more fully set out in the Court’s judgment.

The Court stated that the relationship between an employee and their employer “is contractual, with particular rights and obligations on either side, and is characterised by legal subordination.” (paragraph 117) The court went on to state, at paragraph 118, that “labour law leaves room for negotiation between the parties to the contract of employment. Thus, it is generally for the parties themselves to regulate a significant part of the content of their relations.”

In terms of the margin of appreciation afforded to States under the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court decided, at paragraph 119, that States “must be granted a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the need to establish a legal framework governing the conditions in which an employer may regulate electronic or other communications of a non-professional nature by its employees in the workplace.” However, the Court went on to state, in paragraph 120 of its judgment, that “the discretion enjoyed by States in this field cannot be unlimited. The domestic authorities should ensure that the introduction by an employer of measures to monitor correspondence and other communications, irrespective of the extent and duration of such measures, is accompanied by adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse.” These adequate and sufficient safeguards, the court stated at paragraph 121, “are essential.”

The Court sets out five factors which it considers domestic authorities should treat as being relevant:

What notification has been given to the employee regarding the possibility that the employer might take measures to monitor their correspondence and other communications, and what notification the employee has been given regarding the implementation of these measures;
The extent of the monitoring by the employer and the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy (a distinction should be drawn between simply monitoring the flow of communications and the monitoring of the content of the communications);
The reasons the employer has provided to justify the monitoring of their communications and their actual content – greater justification will be required for monitoring the content as opposed to just the flow;
Whether it would have been possible for the employer to have in place a monitoring system that was based on less intrusive methods and measures than simply directly accessing the content of the employee’s communications;
The consequences of the monitoring for the employee subjected to it, and the use made by the employer of the results of the monitoring operation, in particular whether the results were used to achieve the declared aim of the measure;
Whether there were adequate safeguards in place; especially when the employer’s monitoring operations are of an intrusive nature.

This case makes it clear that it can be legitimate for an employer to monitor, not only the flow of private communications made by an employee on company systems, but also the actual content of the correspondence. However, employers do not have an unlimited right.

Employers will have to think carefully about what aims they are trying to achieve by the monitoring of communications by employees on company systems and whether their proposed method of monitoring is proportionate with that aim. Furthermore, employees should be given clear and fair notice of what monitoring is taking place and the purpose for the monitoring.

Employers will also need to give careful consideration to the safeguards that they need to have in place with regards to the monitoring procedures they have in place and ensure that what safeguards they do have in place are adequate. With regards to safeguards, the court specifically stated that employers should not have access to the actual content of the correspondence concerned unless the employee has been notified in advance.

The court has also said that domestic authorities should ensure that any employee whose communications have been monitored has access to a remedy before a judicial body and that judicial body should have jurisdiction to determine, at least in substance, how the six criteria set out in its judgment have been observed and whether the impugned measures were in fact lawful.

This decision doesn’t really change the law as it already operated. The decision does not prevent employers from undertaking the monitoring of communications by their employees on the employer’s systems. However, the decision does act as a useful reminder that the ability to conduct such monitoring activities is not wholly unrestrained. The decision, coupled with the forthcoming applicability of the General Data Protection Regulation, may well provide a good opportunity for employers to review their policies in this area to ensure that they are compliant with the law.

Alistair Sloan

If you would like advice on a matter concerning data protection or privacy, then you can contact our Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123 or by completing the contact page on this blog. Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail directly.

Welcome to the Information Law Blog by Inksters Solicitors

Welcome to the Information Law Blog from Inksters Solicitors. On this blog we will be covering the latest issues in the areas of Data Protection/Privacy and also Freedom of Information. Most of the contributions to this blog will be by Alistair Sloan, although there may be contributions from other members of the Inksters team from time to time.

Alistair is one our solicitors based in our Glasgow HQ; he offers legal services throughout Scotland in the field of information law, among others. Alistair regulalry travels around Scotland and in particular visits our Caithness base in Wick on a frequent basis. Alistair has been involved in the fields of freedom of information and data protection for a number of years, including prior to qualifying as a solicitor, and has built up a knowledge base on both areas throughout that time. While studying for his Master of Laws degree, he researched the Information Commissioner’s use of Monetary Penalty Notices for breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998.

The area of information law is constantly developing. The biggest change on the horizon is the General Data Protection Regulation, which will be applicable in the UK (and across the rest of the European Union) from 25 May 2018. This new Regulation from the European Union represents the single biggest change to the laws relating to data protection and privacy in the UK in more than 20 years.

Much of the field of Information law is governed by EU law in one way or another, whether it be data protection or access to environmental information held by public authorities; therefore, the hot political subject of Brexit will feature heavily in the information law field over the coming years.

We’re not new to the world of information law; in 2016 our Sylvia MacLennan acted for the successful Petitioner in WF v Scottish Ministers. This case challenged the position in Scotland where an accused person could seek access to the medical records of a complainer in a criminal case, but that the complainer was said not to have any standing to make representations directly to the court (including through their own solicitor) on the question of whether their medical records should be disclosed to the accused. It also challenged the lack of availability of legal aid in Scotland to complainers concerning such issues.

We hope that this blog will become a useful resource for individuals to find out about the latest developments in the field of information law. To keep up to date with this blog and what we are doing you can follow Alistair on twitter here; we also have a dedicated information law twitter account, which you can follow as well.

If you want to discuss an information law matter with Alistair you contact him on 0345 450 0123 or by completing the form on the contact page of this blog. Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail directly.