Tag Archives: Freedom of Information Act 2000

Cart before Horse

E.ON UK Plc v The Information Commissioner and Fish Legal [2019] UKUT 132 (AAC) is an appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) concerning an issue that doesn’t come up very often in information rights litigation: the Information Commissioner’s power to issue an Information Notice under section 51 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”).

The background to this appeal is a little convoluted, but of importance to understanding the issues and the decision of the Upper Tribunal. The solicitor of Fish Legal made a request for information to E.ON UK Plc seeking information from it. The information sought was environmental information and so the request fell to be dealt with under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“EIRs”). E.ON UK Plc disputed that it was not a public authority and so did not issue a substantive response to the request. It became clear during the Commissioner’s involvement that the position of E.ON would be that, if it were a public authority, it did not hold the information.

As there was a dispute as to whether E.ON is a public authority, the Commissioner determined that she needed to resolve that issue first. If E.ON is not a public authority, then she had no jurisdiction to determine whether it held the information in question. After some exchange of correspondence between the Commissioner’s case officer and E.ON, an information notice was served on E.ON. The purpose of this Notice, we learn from the decision of the Upper Tribunal, was to assist the Commissioner in determining whether E.ON UK PLC is a public authority for the purposes of the EIRs.

E.ON appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) against the information notice. It did so on two grounds: firstly, the decision to issue the information notice was unlawful because, as E.ON did not hold the requested information, it was pointless, disproportionate and academic. Secondly, the information requested in the notice was wholly or mainly in the public domain and so it was unlawful to issue an information notice to require E.ON to provide the information.

The First-Tier Tribunal heard argument and issued what it described as a decision on a preliminary issue, inviting written submissions from the parties as to how the remainder of the appeal should progress. E.ON appealed to the Upper Tribunal and its grounds of appeal are set out by the Upper Tribunal in paragraph 4 of its decision.

What is of most interest in this appeal was the position adopted by E.ON as to the Commissioner’s powers to determine whether the information was held or not. E.ON argued that the Commissioner could consider  whether a purported public authority held the information requested, before deciding whether it was reasonable and proportionate to issue an information notice seeking information to assist the Commissioner in deciding whether the purported authority is, in fact, a public authority. E.ON argued, essentially, that where a purported authority did not hold the information it was unlawful, disproportionate and unreasonable for the Commissioner to issue an Information Notice requiring a body to provide her with information to assist her in determining whether the purported authority was, in fact a public authority.

This argument was, ultimately, given short shrift by Upper Tribunal Judge Markus QC. The Upper Tribunal Judge considered that this “position would lead the Commissioner to a dead end” [47] as “[t]here is no statutory provision which could accommodate the outcome for which [Counsel for E.ON] contended, that being a decision by the Commissioner not to address the public authority question because there was no point in doing so.” [47] The outcome of the position advanced by E.ON before the Upper Tribunal would have simultaneously meant that the Commissioner could not have issued a decision notice under section 50 of FOIA that no information was held, because there was no decision that she had jurisdiction; she could not issue a decision on whether she had jurisdiction because it was pointless, and in any event she lacked the information she required to do so and she could not have refused a to make a decision under section 50 because none of the circumstances in section 50(2) of FOIA applied.

Upper Tribunal Markus QC remarks, paragraph 49 of her decision, that what the First-Tier Tribunal decided at paragraph 24 of its own decision was not that it was unable to decide any matter not determined by the Commissioner, but rather that the question whether the information requested by the applicant was held by the authority was irrelevant in an appeal against an information notice which was directed at establishing whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction. The question as to whether the information was held would be decided, if at all, if the Commissioner had jurisdiction to do so.

E.ON also tried to argue that the section 50 application by the applicant should be treated as being frivolous or vexatious by the Commissioner (thus giving her a reason under section 50(2) of FOIA to refuse to issue a decision notice). This, again, was also based upon E.ON’s position that it did not hold the information. E.ON seemed to be suggesting that it was frivolous or vexatious to press for the Commissioner to determine whether she had jurisdiction when the purported authority had demonstrated that it did not hold the information. The Upper Tribunal disagreed stating that “[t]here is nothing in this case which gets close to meeting the high standard set by vexatiousness” [61] (with reference to the principles set out in the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon CC).

What appears to have become lost in these appeal proceedings is that this is an appeal against an information notice and not an appeal against a decision notice. The Tribunal was not concerned with the substantive issue (whether or not E.ON had complied with its obligations under the EIRs, if it has any such obligation at all). E.ON, in this appeal, were getting ahead of themselves; or as the Commissioner reportedly put it “they were putting the cart before the horse”. The Commissioner had not made any decision on the issue (that would not stop the Tribunal considering it though if it were an appeal against a decision notice issued under section 50) as she had been unable to determine the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. The purpose of the Information Notice was to enable her to gather sufficient information to determine that issue.

The Commissioner simply does not, and this has been clear for some considerable time, have the power to determine a substantive issue (such as whether information is held) if she does not have jurisdiction. Where there is doubt about her jurisdiction, that matter has to be resolved by the Commissioner first. If the Commissioner is satisfied of her jurisdiction she will go on to consider the substantive issue (and the two matters will be dealt with in one decision notice dealing first with jurisdiction and then the substantive issue); if she determines that she has no jurisdiction she will issue a decision to that effect which can then be appealed in the normal way.

It remains to be seen whether the Commissioner’s Information Notice will survive; the First-Tier Tribunal has yet to consider all of the matters set out in the initial appeal by E.ON. Now that the Upper Tribunal has disposed of this appeal, the First-Tier Tribunal will now need to hear and determine the rest of the appeal.

Alistair Sloan

If you require advice and assistance with a Freedom of Information matter, or any other information law issue, contact our team on 0141 229 0880 or E-mail info@inksters.com.

Personal data and FOI: the conflict continues

The interaction between freedom of information and data protection laws is one which often results in conflict. On the one hand there is a legislative scheme that operates to promote transparency, while on the other there is a legislative scheme that operates to protect personal data. FOI law essentially provides that information should be released unless there is a good reason not to; while data protection law says that personal data should not be processed unless there is a good reason to. Both have their complexities and those brief explanations do not adequately encapsulate them.

The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Information Commissioner v Halpin [2019] UKUT 29 (AAC) is an example of where the First-Tier Tribunal got it badly wrong when dealing with the legitimate interests ground for processing under the Data Protection Act 1998. The Respondent in this appeal, Mr. Halpin, had requested information from Devon Partnership NHS Trust concerning the training that two named social workers had undergone in respect of the Care Act 2014. When deciding whether to release personal data under FOI law there is essentially a three staged test which must be satisfied before the personal data can be disclosed; this test was set out clearly by the Supreme Court in South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner.

Firstly, is a legitimate interest or interests being pursued by the controller, third party or parties to whim the personal data is to be disclosed? Secondly, if a legitimate interest has been identified, is the processing (by way of disclosure under FOI law) necessary for the purposes of those interests? Finally, if there is a legitimate interest and the processing is necessary for that legitimate interest, then the processing cannot be unwarranted by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.

The first ground of appeal for which permission was granted was in respect of the FTT’s treatment of the effect of disclosure of the information to the world at large; in particular that the FTT had not deal with this matter in substance. This is an issue that needs to be carefully considered: disclosure under FOI is not simply a disclosure to the individual requester; it is a disclosure to the whole world. This is an important factor in determining the necessity of the processing in pursuance of the legitimate interest concerned. It is also important in considering whether the processing (by releasing the information under FOI) is unwarranted.

Once the information is disclosed under FOI law it is disclosed in circumstances where the public authority loses control of the information concerned; there is no duty of confidentiality owed. Therefore, there is nothing that can be done in order to prevent further dissemination of the information.

Upper Tribunal Judge Markus QC states, at paragraph 20, that Mr Halpin’s lack of motivation to publicise the information is irrelevant to the question of assessing the potential impact of disclosure to the world at large. The motivation of the requester is only relevant to the first of the three stages of the test set out in South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner (whether a legitimate interest exist); it is not relevant to the question of necessity or the final question of balancing the legitimate interests against the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the data subject.

Public authorities, and those advising them, should therefore ensure that, when considering the release of personal data in response to a FOI request, they do not become focused on the individual requester; it is essential to consider the wider world when undertaking this assessment. The motivations of the requester might well be wholly benign, but there are others whose motivation may not be so benign and will utilise the information for other purposes. Requesters should also bear this in mind; an individual requester might have a perfectly legitimate interest in the personal data and the necessity test might very well be met in their individual case; that is not enough. Due consideration has to be given to the wider impact of releasing information to the world; this is why consideration has to be given to whether the personal data can be obtained in another way as part of the necessity test (although, the existence of other means of obtaining personal data, other than by way of a FOI request, will not necessarily be determinative of the issue).

Alistair Sloan

We are able to provide advice and assistance to public authorities and requesters in connection with matters concerning Freedom of Information laws; if you would like advice and assistance in connection with these matters, or any other information law matter, please contact Alistair Sloan on 0141 299 0880 or by E-mail. You can also follow our dedicated Information Law Twitter account.

Openness by design: ICO’s draft access to information strategy

The Information Commissioner’s Office has published a draft access to information strategy [pdf] and is inviting comments on it. The document opens by explaining that over the next three years the ICO has the ambition to be “more proactive and increase the impact of” regulation in respect of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“EIRs”).

The document is intended to be read in conjunction with the ICO’s ‘Regulatory Action Policy’, which was consulted on last year (and covers all of the legislation that the Commissioner is tasked with enforcing, not just FOIA and the EIRs).

The draft strategy gives the impression that the ICO intends to become more proactive in its enforcement of FOIA and the EIRs – especially in relation to “systematic non-compliance”. This could mean that the ICO intends become more formal in its enforcement action. So we will need to wait and see how it pans out.

The other matter within the draft strategy that is worthy of note (although it really is worthwhile taking the time to read the whole document – it’s not a lengthy one) is the section which discusses the changes that have occurred since FOIA and the EIRs were enacted. In particular the draft strategy indicates that a report to Parliament will be published later this month “making recommendations for change in relation to outsourced public services and some other categories of public service provision that are not within the scope of the current legislation.” Quite what will happen with such a report, given that Parliament is pretty tied up with Brexit related matters, is unclear; however, it should be worth looking at – especially if you’re involved in the provision of public services under contract.

The ICO is inviting comments on the draft strategy document until 8th March 2019 and comments can be submitted via the ICO website.

The National Security Blanket has been Shrunk

On 2nd January 2018 the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) (consisting of Charles J, Lane J and Anne Chafer)  published an important decision [pdf], dated 14th December 2017, on the application of the exemption in section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

The exemption in section 23 relates to information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.  Subsection (3) provides a list of 15 bodies to which the exemption applies; including the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).  The actual exemption is contained in Section 23(1) and provides that:

Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Background

The decision is worth reading in full, but the essential background to the decision is as follows.  On 21st August 2015 the Royal Air Force carried out a precision air strike in Syria utilising a remotely piloted aircraft (commonly referred to as a ‘drone strike’).  The strike took place in the Syrian city of Raqqa and the target was 21 year-old Reyaad Khan, who was born in Cardiff, and had featured in a ‘recruitment video’ produced by ISIS (also known as IS, Dahesh or ISIL).  The strike killed the intended target along with two other ISIS fighters, one of whom was also British.

On 7th September 2015 the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, made a statement to the House of Commons.  In his statement to the House, Mr. Cameron provided details on the operation which had taken place in August 2015 in Raqqa.  The Upper Tribunal’s written reasons for its decision quote extensively, at paragraph 10, from Mr. Cameron’s statement to the House.  It also quotes an exchange between Mr. Cameron and the then acting leader of the Labour Party, Harriet Harman MP (paragraphs 11 and 12).

In compliance with the United Kingdom’s obligations in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the UK’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations wrote to the President of the Security Council informing the President that the UK had undertaken the 25th August 2015 operation and that this was in “exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.”  The Upper Tribunal have quoted further from that letter in paragraph 13 of its decision.

There is much more to the background which can be dealt with in this blog post; however, it is comprehensively set out in the Upper Tribunal’s decision.  It is suffice to say that Freedom of Information requests were made by the appellants to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and to the Cabinet Office.  These requests were refused by the public authorities and, in three decisions dated 30 August 2016, the Information Commissioner upheld the decisions of the AGO and the Cabinet Office.  The appellants appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) and the appeals were transferred to the Upper Tribunal in terms of Rule 19 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (general regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 – which allows appeals to the First-Tier Tribunal against decisions of the Information Commissioner’s office, amongst others, to be transferred to and be determined by the Upper Tribunal instead of the First-Tier Tribunal; essentially the appeal ‘leap-frogs’ the First-Tier Tribunal.

Section 23 of FOIA

Section 23 of FOIA is an absolute exemption, which means that it is not necessary for the public authority to consider where the public interest rests between maintaining the exemption and disclosure.  It was designed to ensure that there was no backdoor route to gaining access to information held by the security services under FOIA.  The security services are not public authorities for the purposes of FOIA and this exemption ensures that information which is supplied by, or relates to, one of the security bodies in section 23 cannot be obtained from a public body which is a public authority for the purposes of FOIA.  A similar exemption, but not identical, can be found at Section 31 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.

The Upper Tribunal’s decision

The Tribunal’s starting position seems to have been that FOIA provides a right of access to information rather than documents.  When responding to an FOI request, a public authority does not need to supply a copy of the document which contains the requested information (although, in practice an authority will provide the document – redacted where necessary).  The request can be complied with by extracting the information from the document or other records held by the authority (APPGER v ICO and FCO [2015] UKUT 0377 (AAC)).  This seems to be a key pillar of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Corderoy and another v The Information Commissioner and others.

The Upper Tribunal has in this case qualified a statement that was made in the decision of the Upper Tribunal in the APPGER case.  In the APPGER case, the Upper Tribunal stated that “…information, in a record supplied to one or more of the section 23 bodies for the purpose of the discharge of their statutory functions, is highly likely to be information which relates to an intelligence or security body and so exempt under section 23.”  The Respondents in the present case appear to have relied upon this position to argue for a very broad interpretation of section 23.  The Appellants however argued that the absolute exemption in section 23 would prevent disclosure under FOISA unless:  (a) the legal analysis to found the view that he policy decision was lawful can be disaggregated and provided in an intelligible form; and (b) any such disaggregated information falls outside the scope of section 23.

The Appellants were interested in the legal advice which underpinned the Government’s policy decision.  They argued that if this information could property be removed from the documents supplied to the section 23 bodies, and that information itself was not provided by, or related to, a section 23 body, then section 23 did not preclude disclosure and the information instead had to be considered under the qualified exemptions in sections 35(2) and 42 of FOIA (relating to the formulation of government policy and legal advice).

The Upper Tribunal eventually concluded that, while the information in question was clearly of interest to the section 23 bodies; Parliament did not intend, when enacting Section 23(1), for the exemption to apply to information simply because it might be of interest to the section 23 bodies.  The information in question in the present case was concerned with, and confined to, the question as to whether the Government’s policy was lawful.

The Upper Tribunal then went on to consider the public interest arguments, deciding that the public interest rested in maintaining the alternative qualified exemptions rather than in disclosure.  The Upper Tribunal held that it was not necessary for the Government’s legal advice to be shared in order to enable a debate on the lawfulness of the Government’s position to take place; indeed, a considerable debate had already taken place on the issue without the information.

Criticism of the Information Commissioner’s Investigations

The Upper Tribunal also took issue with the way in which the Information Commissioner had conducted her investigations into the complaints made by each of the appellants.  The Information Commissioner had proceeded on the basis of assurances given by the AGO and the Cabinet Office that the information was exempt under section 23(1) of FOIA rather then exercise her statutory powers to require the AGO and Cabinet Office to provide her with the information in question for her consideration.

The Upper Tribunal was extremely critical of this approach by the Commissioner.  The Commissioner did modify her position before the Upper Tribunal; however, the Upper Tribunal remained extremely critical.  At paragraph 95 of its decision, the Upper Tribunal stated:

We acknowledge the resource difficulties of the Information Commissioner but we consider that the course adopted here of effectively permitting the other tow Respondents to be the decision-maker on the challenge to their stance of the application of the absolute exemption in section 23 is unfair.

The Upper Tribunal went on to state in paragraph 97 of its decision that:

If the relevant public authority wishes to avoid a consideration of the relevant documents and so information and disaggregation issues, we have not thought of any circumstances in which it could rely on an assurance rather than a certificate given pursuant to s. 23(2) that can be appealed under section 60.

A certificate under section 23(2) is signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that the information to which the certificate applies was directly or indirectly supplied by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in section 23(3) is conclusive evidence of that fact.  The conclusiveness of the certificate is, however, subject to section 60 of FOIA which allows the Commissioner or any requester who is affected by the certificate to appeal the certificate to the First-Tier Tribunal.  The Tribunal can, if it decides that the information in question is not covered by section 23(1), quash the certificate.

Such a certificate may not ultimately prevent the First-tier Tribunal from carrying out the exercise that the Upper Tribunal ultimately carried out in this case, but it does prevent the Commissioner from doing so as the Commissioner is bound to rely upon such a certificate as being conclusive evidence of the application of section 23(1).

Comment

This was an important decision of the Upper Tribunal which clarifies the scope of Section 23(1) of FOIA and which also makes it clear how the Commissioner should conduct her investigations where a requester is challenging the application of section 23(1) of FOIA, but where no Minister of the Crown has signed a certificate pursuant to Section 23(2) of FOIA.

The Upper Tribunal has provided for a more defined exemption rather than for the blanket approach that was being taken by the Respondents.  What can be taken from this case is that information which may be of interest to those bodies listed in section 23(3) of FOIA, and thereby relate to them, will not automatically engage the exemption in section 23.

The Upper Tribunal’s comments on the way in which the Information Commissioner conducted her investigations in relation to these complaints are also of note, and indeed of wider importance.  It is clear that the Upper Tribunal expects the independent regulator to be independent (perhaps not an unsurprising conclusion); in this case it appears that she did not act as independently as she should have.  It was not appropriate for the Commissioner to rely on assurances given by the public bodies concerned and she ought to have required that a copy of the disputed information be provided to her for her consideration or a certificate issued pursuant to section 23(2) of FOIA.  While sympathetic to the pressure on resources that the Commissioner was experiencing, this did not provide an excuse to her for failing to properly investigate an area of contention between the requesters and the public authorities (and indeed between the public authorities themselves, who arrived at the same conclusion but for different reasons).

Alistair Sloan

We have experience of appeals against decisions of the UK Information Commissioner to the First-Tier and Upper Tribunals and also of handling appeals against decisions of the Scottish Information Commissioner.  If you would like to discuss a Freedom of Information matter with Alistair Sloan then you can contact him on 0345 450 0123 or send him an E-mail.

More is less and less is more

On 30th October 2017 the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) promulgated its decision in McGoldrick v The Information Commissioner; the Tribunal’s decision made two points which it is worth considering.  The request for information in question was made to HM Treasure concerning the Mersey Tunnels; the full terms of the request for information are set out in the Tribunal’s decision.

The first point relates to the use of section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 where some of the information that may fall within the scope of the request is likely to be environmental information; and the second is on the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance.

On the first issue, the Tribunal (at paragraph 12) states that it

“agrees with the Information Commissioner that the appellant’s request could cover both non-environment and environmental information, for the purposes of regulation 2(1)(c) but that it would defeat the purpose behind section 12 and regulation 12(4)(d) if a public authority were obliged to collate the requested information in order to ascertain what information fell under either FOIA or the EIR. We agree, therefore, that HM Treasury was correct to consider the request under section 12, even though it might include some environmental information.”

The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate for an authority to not separately identify environmental information and deal with that under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 where there is a substantial volume of information which covers both environmental and non-environmental information.  It seems that the Tribunal is of the view that there is no need to issue a refusal notice citing Regulation 12(4)(b) [although the Tribunal refers to Regulation 12(4)(d), but this seems as though it may be a typographical error] where a request is going to exceed the appropriate limit and it is likely that there is going to be environmental information within the ambit of the request.

On the second issue, the Tribunal decided that, on the facts of the present case, that HM Treasure did not comply with its obligation to provide adequate advice and assistance and overturned the Commissioner’s decision that it had.  In this case, HM Treasure told the requester that he might like to consider refining his request by reducing the amount of information requested.  The Commissioner considered that such a suggestion was sufficient in order to discharge the authority’s duty to provide advice and assistance.

At paragraph 18 of the Tribunal’s decision it stated:

“Given the widespread nature of computer-driven searches for information in connection with FOIA requests, it is, we consider, reasonable to expect large, sophisticated organisations, such as HM Treasury, to point out to requesters how the most thorough search is likely to exceed the relevant financial limit under the Regulations made by reference to section 12, and to suggest a reformulation of the request in terms specific to computerised searches. Accordingly, if HM Treasury had asked the appellant to reformulate his request by reference to emails and documents containing both the terms “Mersey tunnel” and “toll”, the appellant may well have reformulated his request.”

The Tribunal appears to be suggesting that a large public authority may have to go a bit further than a smaller authority in order to discharge its duty to provide advice and assistance.  It appears that, in certain cases, it may be necessary for a public authority to not only suggest that a requester reformulate their request but rather to go further and actually suggest ways in which it could be reformulated; especially when computer-driver searches for information are involved.

This certainly does fit with the way in which the legislation has been drafted; Section 12(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does include “so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so” within its terms.  So, where an authority is issuing a refusal notice under Section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 authorities, especially larger ones, ought to consider whether they are capable of suggesting how a request could be refined, not just that the requester may wish to consider refining it.

Alistair Sloan

We are able to provide advice and assistance in connection with a range of Freedom of Information matters, including appeals against decisions of both the Scottish and UK Information Commissioners.  If you would like to do discuss a Freedom of Information, or any other Information Law, matter with us then you can contact Alistair Sloan on 0345 450 0123.  Alternatively, you can send him an E-mail.